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FOCUS OF THE PANEL'S ACTIVITIES IN 1985
DIRECTED TOWARD THE FOLLOWING NASA ACTIVITIES:
1, THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (STS) CONTINUING TRANSITION TO
INCREASED LAUNCH FREQUENCY, WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, UNDERGOING A
NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CHANGES,
2, SPACE STATION PROGRAM ORGANIZATION, PLANNING, AND "PHASE B" PROGRAM
DEFINITION AND SYSTEM PRELIMINARY DESIGN,
3, RESEARCH AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY PROGRAM SAFETY DURING GROUND
AND FLIGHT TEST OPERATIONS FOR THE X"29 (FORWARD SWEPT WING) AND THE
X-diNG (ROTOR SYSTEMS RESEARCH AIRCRAFT),
4, OVERALL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION,
5, SPECIAL AREAS,E, G,, SHUTTLE/CENTAUR, RADIOISOTOPE THERMOELECTRIC
GENERATORS, LIFE SCIENCES APPLIED TO FLIGHT PROGRAMS,
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL'S
ANNUAL REPORT
o COVERS ACTIVITIES DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1985 AND EXPECTATIONS FOR 1986
o CONTENTS OF THE ANNUAL REPORT HIGHLIGHTED AT THIS SESSION INCLUDE:
= SUMMARY OF FACT-FINDING CONDUCTED IN 1985
= STATUS OF LAST YEAR'S RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING NASA's RESPONSE IN WRITING
= FINDINGS AHD RECOMMENDATIONS IN OUR CURRENT 1986 REPORT:
• STS-ORBITER STRUCTURAL LIFE CERTIFICATION
i STS-ORBITER STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY
• STS-ORBITER REDLINES AND MODIFICATIONS
• STS-ORBITER AVIONICS AND SOFTWARE
• STS-ORBITER BRAKES AND NOSE WHEEL STEERING
• STS-FLIGHT CREW TRAINING
i STS-SPACE SHUTTLE i-UiN ENGINES
• STS-SoLiD ROCKET BOOSTERS
• STS-LOGISTICS AND LAUNCH PROCESSING
• PAYLOAD INTERFACE STANDARDIZATION
i EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES/SPACE SUITS
• SPACE STATION PROGRAM
• AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS (ADMINISTRATIVE AND R&D)
MSA RESPONSE TO THE AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
1985 ANNUAL REPORT
0 OF 20 ITEMS, 14 ARE "CLOSED" AND 6 ARE "OPEN"
o THE "OPEN" ITEMS ARE:
= STS-TRANSITION OF TASKS (PARTICULARLY SUSTAINING ENGINEERING) FROM JSC TO KSC
= STS-SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM OPERATIONS CONTRACT AT JSC; LAUNCH CONSTRAINT
MODIFICATIONS TO INCREASE LAUNCH PROBABILITY AND REDUCE TURNAROUND TIMESj
COMPREHENSIVE MAINTENANCE PLAN; INITIAL LAY-IN OF SPARES BY OCTOBER 1987
= STS-COMPETITIVE SSME COMPONENT RFP
= STS-FlLAMENT rfOUND ROCKET MOTOR CASE (SRB) CERTIFICATION FOR FLIGHT
= STS-ORBITER "ASKA 6,0" ORBITER LOADS ANALYSES
= SHUTTLE/CENTAUR PREFLIGHT TEST PROGRAM TO CERTIFY CENTAUR VEHICLES,
CURRENT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
#1 STS-ORBITER STRUCTURAL LIFE CERTIFICATION
FINDING - THE WING ROOT FATIGUE ANALYSIS AND FRACTURE ANALYSIS CERTIFICATION REPORT
FUNDING HAS BEEN STOPPED WITHOUT COMPLETION OF THE DOCUMENTATION,
RECOMMENDATION - AN ABBREVIATED CONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS SHOULD BE DOCUMENTED TO FULFILL
THE CERTIFICATION PROGRAM,
#2 STS-ORBITER STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY: "ASKA 6,0" LOADS/STRESS CYCLE PROGRAM
FINDINGS - DUE TO THE LATEST FLIGHT TEST RESULTS, AN ARBITRARY "COLLECTOR FORCE"
(A FORCE SIMULATING STRESSES AT CRITICAL WING LOCATIONS) WILL BE ADDED
TO THE WING LOADS WHICH WILL BE USED IN THE FINAL 6,0 LOADS/STRESS
PROGRAM, ROCKWELL WILL ALSO HAVE TO COMPLETE THE FINAL ANALYSIS WITHIN
AN ALLOCATED BUDGET AND TIME FRAME,,
RECOMMENDATIONS - THE PANEL AGREES WITH THE ARBITRARY FORCE APPROACH TAKEN, HOWEVER,
THE PRIMARY LOAD PATH STRUCTURE AND THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ANALYSIS
SHOULD BE A "STAND ALONE" REPORT FULLY DOCUMENTED AND REFERENCED EVEN IF
THE SEPT 30, 1987 DATE SLIPS, IT is FELT THAT AN OPERATING RESTRICTION
REPORT AND STRENGTH SUMMARY (EXTERNAL LOADS AND VEHICLE STRESS) REPORT FOR
EACH ORBITER SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ORDER TO HAVE QUICK ACCESS TO INFOR-
MATION FOR MAKING FUTURE DECISIONS,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
#3 STS-REDLINE AND MODIFICATIONS
FINDINGS - LOADS ANALYSIS FROM ORBITER CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT-CYCLE "D" AND"COLLECTOR
LOAD" CONCEPT REQUIRE WING MODS ON ALL VEHICLES,
RECOMMENDATIONS - IN ORDER TO PROVIDE 85% LAUNCH PROBABILITY REDLINES, THE MODIFI-
CATIONS SHOULD BE MADE, EVEN IF SLIGHTLY CONSERVATIVE, IN SOME STRUCTURAL
AREAS, REDLINES ON OV-103 AND OV-104 SHOULD BE SPECIFICALLY EXAMINED
AND CHANGED AS REQUIRED,
«W STS-ORBITER AVIONICS AND SOFTWARE
FINDINGS - ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED THAT NO CHANGES WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE
APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE FOR THE NEW, UPRATED GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTERS GPC's),
THERE REMAINS A NAGGING CONCERN THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE, THE NEW
COMPUTER HAS NEW CODES AND THE TEMPTATION WILL BE GREAT TO USE THEM TO
"IMPROVE" THE APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE, To DISCOURAGE THIS HUMAN FOIBLE, THE
SOFTWARE COMPILER WILL NOT RECOGNIZE THE NEW CODES, FOR MEETING THE"
LOGISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE NEW COMPUTERS THE PLAN IS TO BUY ONE NEW
COMPUTER EACH YEAR AFTER THE INITIAL PURCHASE,
RECOMMENDATIONS - NASA MUST MONITOR THIS MOST CAREFULLY SINCE APPLICATIONS SOFTWARE
CAN BE VERY EXPENSIVE TO CHANGE AND RETEST, DISCIPLINE WITH REGARD TO THE
NEW COMPUTER CODES MAY BE MORE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT THAN MANAGEMENT
THINKS,,,IT WAS TRIED ON THE APOLLO PROGRAM WITH LITTLE OR NO SUCCESS,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
ti*\ CONTINUED
THE WISDOM OF PROCURING ONE NEW COMPUTER EACH YEAR MAY WELL LEAD TO
THE SAME PROBLEM WITH SPARES FOUND THROUGHOUT THE LlHE.r.REPLACEABLE UNIT (LRU)
PROGRAM, AND DESERVES ADDITIONAL ATTENTION, ESPECIALLY WITH INCREASING
FLIGHT RATE AND THE USE OF "NEW" COMPUTERS,
#5 STS-BRAKES AND NOSE WHEEL STEERING
FINDINGS « THE STS PROGRAM HAS MADE A GREAT DEAL OF PROGRESS IN ALLEVIATING THE
BRAKE PROBLEMS FOUND ON NEARLY ALL OF THE FIRST 21 FLIGHTS. WlTH THE
ACTIVATION OF NOSE WHEEL STEERING CAPABILITY, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED
LESSENING OF BRAKE DAMAGE DURING SUBSEQUENT LANDINGS, THE DECISION TO
PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF THE STRUCTURAL CARBON BRAKE, AND POSSIBLY
USE A FIFTH ROTOR TO REPLACE THE CURRENT BERYLLIUM ROTORS AND STATORS,
HAS BEEN MADE,
RECOMEi'WATIONS - STANDARD USE OF NOSE WHEEL STEERING is RECOMMENDED, REGARDLESS OF
THE TYPE OF BRAKES, THE SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SHOULD ALSO BE ANALYZED TO
PERMIT INCREASING NOSE WHEEL STEERING AUTHORITY AS MCUH AS PRACTICABLE
IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE CROSSWIND LANDING CAPABILITY, THE CARBON BRAKE
DESIGN SHOULD BE PURSUED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO REPLACE CURRENT
MATERIALS, THE RESULTING CONFIGURATION SHOULD PROVIDE MANIFOLD IMPROVE-
MENT IN ORBITER LANDING GROUND ROLL CONTROL AND STOPPING RELIABILITY,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
#6 FLIGHT CREW TRAINING
FINDINGS - THE ORBITER LANDING is A CRITICAL PHASE OF EACH STS MISSION, FLYING
QUALITIES OF THE ORBITER ARE UNIQUE DUE TO ITS CONFIGURATION, COMPOUNDING
THE DEMANDS UPON THE FLIGHT CREWS AT THIS CRITICAL TIME, THE TIME
AVAILABLE IN THE PRESENT FLEET OF ORBITER FLIGHT SIMULATOR AIRCRAFT IS
BECOMING MARGINAL AND CAN BE FORESEEN AS BEING INADEQUATE TO MEET
FUTURE TRAINING DEMANDS,
KECOrulblDATIONS - NASA MUST COMMIT THE FUNDS IN A TIMELY MANNER TO ENSURE AN
ADEQUATELY-SIZED FLEET OF TRAINING AIRCRAFT TO MEET THE FLIGHT CREW
TRAINING NEEDS, WITHOUT REDUCTION OR COMPROMISE TO THE ORBITER FLIGHT
TRAINING SYLLABUS,
#7 SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES (SSME's)
FINDINGS - IN 19d3, A THREE-PHASE PROGRAM WAS INITIATED TO SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVE
THE SSME, FUNDING CONSTRAINTS RESULTED IN RESTRUCTURING THE PROGRAM IN
1984 TO ADDRESS ONLY CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS TO THE VARIOUS TURBOPUMP
COMPONENTS PLUS A LIMITED EFFORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW HOT-GAS MANIFOLD,
THE TURBOPUMP IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING INCORPORATED INTO A TWO-ENGINE
PHASE II RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM, A THREE-ENGINE MAIN PROPULSION-SYSTEM
TEST IS SCHEDULED TO BE PERFORMED TO ASSURE THERE ARE NO FEED-SYSTEM
INTERACTION PROBLEMS AT 109% OF RATED POWER OPERATION,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
#7 CONTINUED
RECOMMENDATIONS - THE RECERTIFICATION APPROACH SELECTED BY NASA PERMITS DIFFERENT
PARTS OF THE ENGINE TO BE "CERTIFIED" FOR DIFFERENT FLIGHT TIMES, HOWEVER,
SINCE MOST OF THE PHASE II TURBOPUMP COMPONENT IMPROVEMENTS REALLY ONLY
ADDRESS DEGRADATION RATES OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS UNDER NOMINAL MISSION
ENVIRONMENTS RATHER THAN INCREASED STRESS LEVEL MARGINS (EXCEPTIONS ARE
DECREASED HPFTP TURBINE DISCHARGE TEMPERATURES, ABOUT 100°, AND A 7,000 RPM
IMPROVEMENT IN SYNCHRONOUS WHIRL MARGIN ON THE HPOTP), THE PANEL RECOMMENDS
THAT THE ENGINE BE OPERATED AT POWER LEVELS ABOVE 104% RPL ONLY WHEN
MANDATORY, ALSO, WHEN ENGINE OPERATION ABOVE 104% IS NECESSARY, THE POWER
LEVEL SELECTED BY ONLY THE VALUE REQUIRED FOR THE PARTICULAR MISSION,
•-rts-ta&ifTzt' '&t&4uai*»a~*-f~ /£C£L
THE PliAGC H HARDWARE NECESSARY TO PROV4-BE THE DATA BASE FOR THE MODIFIED&*^ r
TURBOPUMPS SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SSME'S NEW CERTIFICATION STATUS
AND PTHlK'T FLIGHT SAFETY MARGINS, FURTHER, THE WPRECURSOR"(FUTURE) IMPROVE-
MENTS BE SUPPORTED ATA LEVEL SUCH THAT THEY CAN BE INCORPORATED AS SOON AS ° §
T)S
POSSIBLE INTO THE FLIGHT ENGINES, §Z
#8 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS * I"
FINDINGS - THE INTEGRATED LOADS IMPACT OF THE NEW VAFB LAUNCH MOUNT AND THE FILAMENT
WOUND MOTOR CASE FLEXIBILITY HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND PREDICTED, HOWEVER,
THE "HOLD-DOWN" SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER CALIBRATION CONFIRMATION TESTS WILL
NQT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL LATE SPRING OF 1986,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
#8 CONTINUED
RECOMMENDATIONS - THE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER HOLD-DOWN BOLT CALIBRATION TESTS SHOULD
BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED AT THIS TIME TO AID IN OBTAINING MANINGFUL FINAL
TEST RESULTS, IF THE CALIBRATED TEST RESULTS DIFFER FROM CURRENT PREDICTIONS
THEN PRELAUNCH AND LIFT'OFF LOADS FOR THE EXTERNAL TANK AND SOLID ROCKET
BOOSTER WILL BE INCORRECT,
ElfllMGS. - THE FILAMENT WOUND CASE TEST ARTICLE. STA-2, WAS TESTED AND PREMATURELY
FAILED, HOWEVER, THERE WERE PROCESS AND DESIGN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STA-2
AND THE FLIGHT ARTICLE, ADDITIONAL TESTS ARE BEING MADE TO CERTIFY THE
FOLAMENT WOUND CASE DESIGN, THERE IS A HEAVY DEPENDENCE ON ANALYSIS AND
MODIFICATIONS BASED ON A VERY LIMITED HARDWARE BASE AND A SET OF DESIGN
CHANGES RESULTING FROM TEST FAILURES,
RECOMMENDATIONS - CONTINUED ANALYSIS AND FURTHER STUDIES HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED IN ORDER
TO FULLY UNDERSTAND THE FAILURE MODE, ADDITIONAL STUDIES SHOULD CONTINUE
TO EVALUATE MEMBRANE/TRANSITION LAY-UPS AND COUPON SPECIMENS, UNTIL THE
ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED WITH A HIGH LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE, THE PANEL BELIEVES
THE FILAMENT WOUND CASE MOTOR SEGMENTS SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR STS LAUNCH,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
#9 LOGISTICS AND LAUNCH PROCESSING
FINDINGS - THE SHUTTLE PROCESSING CONTRACTOR, WHILE NOT YET AT ITS PEAK, HAS LAID
THE ORGANIZATIONAL GROUNDWORK AND OBTAINED THE RIGHT SORT OF PEOPLE,
A GENERAL ASSESSMENT INDICATES VERY SATISFACTORY PROGRESS IS BEING MADE,
LAUNCH RATE PREDICTIONS ARE STILL OPTIMISTIC, ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRANSFER
OF FUNCTIONS SUCH AS SUSTAINING ENGINEERING, LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT, ETC,,
FROM JSC TO KSC SEEM TO BE WELL ORGANIZED AND ORDERLY, IF SOMEWHAT SLOW,
OVERALL SAFETY PRACTICES AND MONITORING SYSTEMS—ESPECIALLY BY THE SPC—
AT KSC ARE PRAISEWORTHY AND WOULD APPEAR TO DO EVERYTHING REASONABLE TO
ENSURE THE SAEETY OF OPERATING PERSONNEL,
RECOMMENDATIONS - A, NASA MANAGEMENT SHOULD MONITOR CLOSELY THE EFFECTS OF THE
RECENT REORGANIZATION AT KSC TO MAKE SURE THAT IT HAS ACCELERATED AND
SIMPLIFIED MANAGEMENT OF LAUNCH PROCESSING,
B, NASA SHOULD EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING DATA SYSTEMS UNDER
MANAGEMENT OF THE SPC, SUCH AS CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT, THAT WILL CENTRALIZE
AND AUGMENT KSC'S OPERATIONAL LAUNCH CAPABILITY,
C, NASA SHOULD CONTINUE TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO ACQUISITION OF SPARE
PARTS AND TO UPGRADE THE RELIABILITY (PLANNED LIFE) OF HARDWARE,
D, NASA SHOULD EXPLORE WHETHER BETTER COORDINATION BETWEEN MANIFESTING
AND PAYLOADS WOULD EASE THE LAUNCH PROCESSING SEQUENCE,
FINDINGS AND RECOMENDATIONS CONTINUED
#9 CONTINUED
E, FACILITIES SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO MINIMIZE TURNAROUND TIMES AND
SHOULD INCLUDE AN ORBITER MAINTENANCE AND REFURBISHMENT FACILITY AND
THE APPROPRIATE LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT REPAIR FACILITIES,
B, PAYLOAD INTERFACE STANDARDIZATION
FINDINGS - SHUTTLE TURNAROUND TIMES REMAIN IN THE FOREFRONT OF PLANNING FOR FUTURE
STS FLIGHTS, ONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT FACTORS THAT AFFECTS TURNAROUND TIMES
IS THE LACK OF INTERFACE STANDARDIZATION AMONG THE VARIOUS PAYLOADS, A
CONSIDERABLE EFFORT HAS BEEN EXPENDED IN THE AREA OF STANDARDIZATION AND
THE PRIME EXAMPLE IS THE PAYLOAD ASSIST MODULE (PAM),
RECOMMENDATIONS - THERE WILL ALWAYS BE PECULIAR REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL PAYLOADS,
BUT INSOFAR AS IS FEASIBLE, THERE SHOULD BE INCREASING EFFORT TO PREPARING
AND CARRYING PAYLOADS IN A STANDARDIZED FASHION,
C, EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITIES (EVA)/SPACE SUITS
FINDINGS - 1985 WAS A-.YEAR OF EXTENSIVE EVA,,,THE LEASAT OR SYNCOM "RESCUE;; MISSION
WAS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE, CERTAINLY THE SPACE STATION WILL REQUIRE
EXTENSIVE EVA, THE NEED REMAINS FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE SUIT AT HIGHER PRESSURE,
RECOMMENDATIONS - NASA SHOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE FLEXIBLE,
HIGHER PRESSURE SUIT,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED
D, SPACE STATION
FINDINGS - THE SPACE STATION ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE is QUITE COMPLEX, WITH ROLES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES DIFFICULT TO DISCERN AT TIMES, THE SYSTEM IS MATURING,
WHILE THERE REMAINS SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING NASA'S ABILITY TO ADEQUATELY
HANDLE THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND COMPLETE INTEGRATION OF PHASES C & D,
ON THE STS PROGRAM SYSTEMS INTEGRATION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH A
CONTRACTOR WITH NASA OVERSIGHT AND DIRECTION,
RECOMMENDATIONS - NASA SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE RESOURCES REQUIRED TO CONDUCT THE MANY
FACETS OF THE SPACE STATION INTEGRATION EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT-THE ORGANI-
ZATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROPERLY FILL THIS ROLE,
FINDINGS - THE SPACE STATION EXISTS IN AN ESSENTIALLY BENIGN ENVIRONMENT ONCE ON
ORBIT WHEN COMPARED TO THE ASCENT CONDITIONS WITHIN THE ORBITER PAYLOAD BAY,
RECOMMENDATIONS - NASA SHOULD DETERMINE POSSIBLE MEANS TO ALLEVIATE THE PAYLOAD BAY
INTERFACE ENVIRONMENT AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (VIBRATION, ACCELERATIONS,
LOADS) WHICH DRIVE SOME OF THE SPACE STATION ELEMENT AND "USER" DESIGNS,
F IMP INGS - -vBu i LD -TO-COST" MANAGEMENT FOR THE SPACE STATION MAY INVOLVE MANY OF THE
SAME OR SIMILAR ACTIVITIES THAT CONFRONTED THE SPACE SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT
IN ITS FORMATIVE DAYS, LOOKING INTO EARLY SHUTTLE LESSONS-LEARNED COULD
PROVIDE SPACE STATION MANAGEMNT AN UNDERSTANDING OF POSSIBLE PTFALLS TO
AVOID, AND PERHAPS POSITIVE DIRECTIONS TO TAKE,
FINDINGS AND RECOKNDATIONS CONTI NUED
SPACE STATION CONTINUED
RFTn:ii-iF=inATinNS - NASA SHOULD ESTABLISH A SMALL TEAM COMPOSED OF CURRENT AND RETIRED
NASA/CONTRACTOR PERSONS WHO HAVE FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE EARLY
ACTIVITIES (1972-1976) ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM, THEY SHOULD DEFINE
THE APPROPRIATE "LESSONS LEARNED" IN BOTH TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT AREAS,
INCLUDING THE REAL POSSIBILITY OF USING TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY TO STATION NEEDS,
E, AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
FINDINGS - THERE is STILL NO HEAD OF THE NASA HEADQUARTERS AIRCRAFT MANAGEMENT OFFICE,
THIS PRECLUDES PROPER FOCUSING OF MANAGEMENT'S ATTENTION UPON ACHIEVING
CENTRALIZED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONAL CONTROL,
RECOMMENDATIONS - NASA SHOULD APPOINT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A QUALIFIED OPERATIONS
MANAGER AS HEAD OF THE AlRCRAcT MANAGEMENT OFFICE, DETERMINE MEANS AND METHODS
TO REDUCE THE TIME IT TAKES TO OBTAIN REVIEW AND APPROVAL FOR CRITICAL FLIGHT
OPERATIONS GUIDELINES AND POLICIES,
FACT-FINDING RESULTS OF 1935 --- DETAILS
STARTING ON PAGE 33 OF THE PANEL'S ANNUAL REPORT YOU WILL
FIND DETAILS AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THESE
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
NASA'S RESPONSE TO THE PANEL'S PREVIOUS ANNUAL REPORT CAN BE
FOUND STARTING ON PAGE 63 OF THIS YEAR'S ANNUAL REPORT,
PANEL PLANS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1986
AS A RESULT OF THE STS 51-L ACCIDENT AND ASSOCIATED INVESTIGATIVE
ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE BEGUN/ THE AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL HAS SET
ASIDE AS MUCH OF ITS PLANNING FOR 1986 AS NECESSARY TO SERVE NASA
IN SUPPORT OF DETERMINING AND CORRECTING THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT,
AS WE DID FOR APOLLO 13 AND SKYLAB INVESTIGATIONS,
THEREFORE/ AS IT CAN/ THE PANEL WILL LOOK INTO OR CONTINUE TO REVIEW
THE FOLLOWING GENERAL AREAS',
o SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM CONTINUING ACTIVITIES AT NASA CENTERS
AND CONTRACTORS/ INCLUDING FUTURE PAYLOAD INTEGRATION,
o SPACE STATION AS IT MOVES THROUGH CURRENT PHASE B ACTIVITIES INTO
THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION PHASES C/D,
0 A NUMBER OF SUPPORTING AREAS/ SUCH AS LIFE SCIENCES*,1 HUMAN FACTORS/
EXTRA-VEHICULAR ACTIVITIES/ AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS/ GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
AND FACILITIES/ AND PAYLOAD INTERFACES,
o SPECIAL AREAS: OBLIQUE WING RESEARCH AIRCRAFT PROJECT/ TETHER SATELLITE
PROJECT AS IT INTERFACES WITH THES-UTTLE, ORBITER "HEADS-UP" ASCENT
MODE OF FLIGHT/ IMPACTS OF SPACE DEBRIS/
ffif-
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel shares in
the nation's grief over the loss of the Space
Shuttle Challenger and its heroic crew. Despite
this, the Panel believes it is essential for
NASA to continue its manned space flight program.
The Findings and Recommendations of this annual
report were completed prior to the January 28th
accident.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The level of activity of the Aerospaeo Safety Advisory Panel
was increased somewhat during 1985 in concert with the increased
mission rate of the National Space Transportation System, the
evolutionary changes in management and operation of that program,
and the preparation of the Vandenberg Launch Site; the
implementation of the Program Definition Phase of the Space
Station Program; and actual flight testing of the X-29 research
aircraft. The Panel continued its review of impending unigue
payload STS missions and NASA's overall aircraft operations. The
Panel also responded to a reguest by the NASA Administrator to
assess the safety aspects of the Leasat salvage mission.
This report summarizes the Panel's 1985 work, and enumerates
its findings and recommendations for the attention of NASA
management. NASA's response to the Panel's 1984 report findings
and recommendations is appended hereto (ref. Appendix E).
The Panel wishes to note its appreciation for the continuing
excellent support of all government and industry entities
contacted, thus enabling the Panel to perform its statutory
responsibilities.
Panel Meetings
The full Panel or Panel members conducted 54 fact finding
sessions during calendar 1985. Meetings were held at NASA
Headguarters, seven NASA Centers, six contractor sites,
Vandenberg Air Force Base, and three other locations. In
addition, the Panel presented testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate, and held other discussions with
congressional staff.
Space Transportation System (STS)
The STS performed in a highly credible manner durinq 1985.
T. t was a period of: continuing transition to increased launch
freguency, while, at the same time, undergoing a number of
organizational and operational responsibility changes (which
included numerous key personnel changes). The program team
(government and industry) demonstrated its capability to
successfully deal with real-time anomalies to plans, and its
flexibility to revise, implement, and execute new plans and
schedules to accommodate the anomalies. An outstanding example
of this was the Leasat salvage mission. Given the operational
system complexities and the sheer magnitude of effort reguired
to safely execute each STS mission, the Program achievements
during 1985 were, indeed, noteworthy.
Attainment of NASA's goal of 24 STS launches per year remains
sometime in the future, challenging the capacities of both
physical and human resources. While plans are being implemented
to provide the necessary balance of resources, the goal is all
the more challenging considering that: (1) a number of flight
hardware components are still undergoing development fo'r both
performance and reliability; (2) additional "brick and mortar"
facilities are reguired at KSC for orbiter processing and
component maintenance; (3) there are ultimate limitations of
human resources to compensate for shortfalls in the physical
resources (even with extraordinary dedication and effort); (4)
sufficient logistics support, in both hardware and systems, lies
sometime in the future; and (5) the fact that all of the above
are subject to constraints by budgetary allocations.
Nevertheless, the Panel believes that a safe and productive STS
Program can be carried out if the System's real state-of-the-art
and other limitations are recognized and integrated into the
program planning and scheduling.
Several elements of the STS are discussed und.er Section II
and expanded upon under Section IV of this report. One which the
Panel wishes to note in this section is the uncertainty of the
structural strength of the Filament Wound Case (FWC) for the
Solid Rocket Roosters (SRRs). Tests and analyses to date leave
considerable question as to the strength margins of safety in the
transition areas between case segments. Until the issue can be
resolved with a high level of confidence, the Panel believes the
FWC SRBs should not be used for STS launch (and certainly not for
first launch from VLS). A great deal of attention is being given
to the issue, including a select committee of the most
knowledgeable experts available.
The Panel also wishes to note its support of the NASA/Air
.Force decision to reschedule the first STS launch from the
Vandenberg Launch Site (VLS) until after mid 1986. Good progress
is being made in bringing the VLS on-line and the additional time
to complete the process will provide for orderly checkout and
confirmation of launch readiness for both the site facility and
the launch team.
STS - Payload Related Issues
There do not seem to be many payload-related safety issues
arising. This would say that all the time and effort spent on
payload planning has been well spent and while the system at
first glance seems formidable, it is entirely workable as many
payloads have proven. The exceptional performance of the
astronauts in space in payload emergencies is such that .this
factor should be recognized in the design of payloads, with for
instance, the accessibility to a suited crewman of critical parts
of the payload. It also points up the continuing need for a more
flexible space suit or alternatively an end-of-arm manipulator to
perform the normal hand functions--perhaps both.
Shuttle - Centaur
The Centaur payload is a special case. The Centaur is a
complex, massive machine using cryogenic fuel, originally
designed for unmanned launch and with a long successful history.
The hazards—particularly in an abort situation—of the Centaur
to the Shuttle are such that it must he integrated with the
Shuttle, rather than being just a payload. This has been a long
hard task but seems to be well underway. The remaining problems
do not seem to be technical but rather schedule.
Radioisotope Thermal Generator (RTG)
The deployment into space of an RTG requires specific
Presidential authorization before launch. There is a mechanism
set up to accomplish the risk assessment and in the past the
necessary launch permission has been granted. Except for some of
the manned abort scenarios, there are no substantially greater
risks with the Shuttle Centaur than with previous unmanned
launches, both solid and liauid fueled, carrying RTGs in the
payload. We do not see an undue safety concern in the use of an
RTG on the upcoming Shuttle Centaur flights, in light of the
reviews, attention, and consideration that have been given this
issue .
Space Station
The Panel continued to monitor the Space Station Program
organization, planning, and "Phase B" (program definition and
system preliminary design) through 1985 * A broadly based effort
is well under way, involving NASA Headquarters, four NASA Centers
(each with line responsibility), the full spectrum of U.S.
aerospace industry in competitive and support roles, and several
international partners. Both the program goals and the broad
institutional involvement in program execution create very
challenging management requirements. The panel foresees
management/organizational concepts and arrangements, consistent
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f u n d i n g suppor t , and jud ic ious f u n d i n g a l loca t ion as being the
key factors in successful ly ach iev ing the Pres iden t ' s object ives
for the Space Station Program. The technologies needed to
produce and deploy the Space Station are essentially in-hand
( r e l a t i ve ly l i t t le "new technology" is required compared to the
STS P r o g r a m ) .
The Panel w i l l cont inue to mon i to r the program developments,
p r i n c i p a l l y with , regard to the r e s u l t i n g e f f e c t s on system
s a f e t y . Some of the Pane l ' s c u r r e n t cons idera t ions are discussed
in Section IV.
Space Junk
The safety concern caused by the presence in space of debris
from past launches and satellites is growing but is difficult to
characterize, except statistically. This "space junk issue" can
only be resolved by international cooperation and action, and
such a solution is slow. Efforts to resolve this issue
internationally must be intensified before it moves from the
concern to the problem condition. Any solution must consider not
only the large trackable units but the small debris that
represents an unavoidable collision hazard. The Panel would urge
NASA through appropriate channels to establish an international
consideration of this issue before it becomes a critical problem.
Research Aircraft Programs
State-of-the Art extensions in Aeronautics are being
undertaken in the experimental aircraft" programs, such as the
X-29 (forward swept wing) and X-Wing Rotor Systems Research
Aircraft. Panel members with expertise in the related
technologies and experimental flight programs are active in
program safety assessments. To dat-.«?> the Panel is satisfied that
appropriate safety initiatives ;>rc proving to be effective. Both
programs involve new techoloqies and complex control systems,
w i n\ a t t e n d a n t , r i s k s , and r e q u i r o a h i q h lovo l of on-qoinq s a f e t y
omphas i s .
NASA Aircraft Operations
While the Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel continues
preparation of operations guideline documents, a void still
exists at NASA Headquarters in appointing a qualified management
level individual to head up the Aircraft Management Office. The
ASAP believes strongly that agency-wide operations and
maintenance standards should be established under Headquarters
authority and administered through the leadership of an
operations qualified manager or director.
II. FINDINGS AND RKCOMMKNOATlONS
A. Space Transportation System (STS)
1. prbiter Structural Life Certification
Findings
The wing root fatigue analysis and fracture analysis
certification report funding has been stopped without
completion of the documentation.
Recommendat ions
An abbreviated conservative analysis should be
documented to fulfill the certification program.
2. Orbiter Structural Adequacy; "ASKA 6" Loads/Stress
Cycle Program
Findings
Due to the latest flight test results, an arbitrary
"collector force" (a force simulating stresses at critical
wing locations) will be added to the winq loads which will
be used in the final 6.0 loads/stress program. Rockwell
will also have to complete the final analysis within an
allocated budget and time frame.
Recommendations
The Panel agrees with the arbitrary force approach
taken at this time. However, the primary load path
structure and thermal protection system analysis should be
a stand alone report fully documented and referenced even
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if the 0/30/87 end dato slips. In addition, it- is felt
th.it an operating restriction report and strength summary
(external loads and vehicle stress) report for each
orbiter should be prepared in order to have quick access
to information for making future decisions.
3. Redlines and Modifications
Find ings
Loads analysis from Orbiter capability assessment -
Cycle' "D" (OCA - D) and "collector load" concept require
wing mods (MOD I, II & HI, see section IV. D.I. a) on all
vehicles .
Recommendat ions
In order to provide 85% launch probability redlines,
the modifications should be made, even if slightly
conservative, in some structural areas. Redlines on 0V -
103 and 0V - 104 should be specifically examined and
changed as required.
4. Orbiter Avionics and Software
Find ings
Although we have been assured that no changes will be
required in the applications software for the new, uprated
general purpose computers (GPCs), there remains a nagging
concern that this might not be the case. The new computer
has new codes and the temptation will be great to use them
to "improve" the applications software. To discourage
this human foible, the software compiler will not
recognize the new codes. For meeting the logistics
associated with these new computers the plan is to buy one
new computer each year after the initial purchase.
Rec_pmmend a t i o n s
NASA must monitor this most carefully sinco
applications software can be very expensive to change and
retest. Discipline with regard to the new computer codes
may be more difficult to implement than management
thinks...it was tried on the Apollo program with little or
no success. The wisdom of procuring one new computer each
year may well lead to the same problem with spares found
throughout the LRU program, and deserves additional
Attention, especially with increasing flight rate and the
use of "new" computers.
5• Brakes and Nose Wheel Steering
_Fjind ings
The STS program has made a great deal of progress in
alleviating the brake problems found on nearly all of the
first 21 flights, with the activation of nose wheel
steering capability, there has been a marked lessening of
brake damage during subseguent landings. The decision to
proceed with development of the structural carbon brake,
and possibly use a fifth rotor to replace the current
bei-yllium rotors and stators, has been made.
Reoommendat ions
Standard use of. nose wheel steering is recommended,
fegardless of the type of brakes. The system performance
should also be analyzed to permit increasing nose wheel
steering authority as much as practicable in order to
maximize crosswind landing capability. The carbon brake
design should be pursued as quickly as possible to replace
cur;i;ent materials. The resulting configuration should
provide manifold improvement in Orbiter landing ground
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roll control and stopping reliability. Further, the Panel
is still hopeful that NASA will seek practical means of
reducing Orbiter landing speed.
6. Flight Crew Training
Find ings
The Orbiter landing is a critical phase of each STS
mission. Flying qualities of the Orbiter are unique due
to its configuration, compounding the demands upon the
flight crews at this critical time. NASA has recognized
this and met the requirements by assignment of skilled
pilots who receive extensive hands-on training in ground
simulators and Orbiter flight simulator aircraft. The
increasing STS mission rate demands an attendant increase
in flight crew training. The time available in the
present fleet of Orbiter flight simulator aircraft is
becoming marginal and can be foreseen as being inadequate
to meet future training demands.
Recommendat ions
NASA must commit the funds in a timely manner to
ensure an adequately-sized fleet of training aircraft to
meet the flight crew training needs, without reduction or
compromise to the Orbiter flight training syllabus.
7. Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs)
F i nd i ng s
In 1983, a three-phase program was initiated to
substantially improve the SSME. However, as a result of
severe fund Ing-rate limitations, the program was
restructured in 1984 to address only certain improvements
51,
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to the wear' life of various turbopump components (Phase
It), plus a limited effort on development of a new hot-gas
manifold (Phase TI+). Most of the turbopump component
improvement work has gone very well during 1985, and these
new components will be incorporated into a two-engine
Phase II recertification program. This "certification" is
planned to demonstrate that the non-turbopump components
of the engines are capable of 20 missions (with 40%
operation at 109% of rated thrust), and that the
high-pressure turbopumps are capable of 5 missions. A
three-engine main propulsion-system test (MPT) is
scheduled to be performed to assure there are no
feed-system interaction problems at 109% operation. The
Panel strongly supports this system test as being highly
desirable.
The new powerhead manifold will be incorporated in a
later demonstration program in 1986, but at the present
time there is no approved plan to demonstrate the
large-throat combustion chamber, which is necessary to
really improve significantly the turbopump operating
environments at 109% thrust.
Recommendations
The recertification approach selected by NASA permits
different parts of the engine to be "certified" for
different flight times. However, since most of the Phase
II turbopump component improvements really only address
degradation rates of critical components under nominal
mission environments rather than increased stress level
margins (the exceptions are the decreased High Pressure
Fuel Turbine discharge temperatures ~100° and a 7000 RPM
improvement in synchronous whirl margin on the oxidizer
turbopump), the Panel recommends that the engine be
operated at power levels above 104% of rated power only
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when mandatory. Also, when engine operation above 104% is
necessary, the power level selected be only the value
required for the particular mission and not taken all the
way to 109% except when m.nui.i tory.
The Phase II development and demonstration program
should provide a data base for the modified turbopumps
which can be used to estimate new
Mean-Time-Before-Replacement criteria for the
turbo-machinery. The hardware necessary to support this
replacement rate should be made available in order to
maintain the engine's new certification status and protect
flight safety margins.
We further recommend that the "precursor" (future)
program improvements be supported at a level such that
they can in fact be incorporated as soon as possible into
the flight engines. In the long run, such expenditures
will be cost effective as they result in more reliable
flight engines with lower maintenance costs and a higher
availability factor.
8. Solid Rocket Boosters
Find ings
The effect of the new launch mount and the filament
wound motor case flexibility has been assessed by "Cycle
III" loads analysis and found to be similar to the
previous calculated "Cycle II-B" loads which gives added
confidence to predictions made to date. However, the hold
down Solid Rocket Booster calibration confirmation tests
will not be available until late Spring of 1986.
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Re c oni in ondations
The Solid Rocket Booster hold-down bolt calibration
tests should be carefully examined at this time to aid in
obtaining meaningful final test results. If the
calibrated test results differ from that used in the
Cycle-Ill analysis then the prelaunch and lift-off loads
for the External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster will be
incorrect. This could cause serious problems in meeting
launch requirements.
Find ings
The f i l a m e n t wound case test a r t i c le , STA-2, was
tested and prematurely f a i l ed . However, there were
process and design d i f f e r e n c e s between STA-2 and the VLS-1
f l i g h t ar t ic le . The follow-on test STA-2B w i l l be tested
to 1 4 0 % of l imi t load using a design comparable to the
f l i g h t test article. Addit ional full-scale pressure and
compression tests are being made to ce r t i fy the f i l amen t
wound case design. There is a heavy dependence on
ana lys i s and modi f ica t ions based on a very l imi ted
hardware base and a set of design changes resul t ing from
test f a i l u r e s .
Recommendat ions
Continued analysis and f u r t h e r s tudies have to be
conducted in order to f u l l y unders tand the f a i l u r e mode.
Addi t iona l studies should cont inue to eva lua te
membrane / t rans i t ion lay-ups and coupon specimens. U n t i l
the issue can be resolved wi th a high level of conf idence ,
the Panel believes the FWC SRBs should not be used for STS
l a u n c h . The Panel would l ike to be kept in formed of the
ana lys i s results and of these upcoming tests.
35
13
l>. Logistics and Launch Processing
F i nd i ng s
The Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC), while not yet
at its peak, has laid the organizational groundwork and
obtained the right sort of personnel during the year. A
general assessment indicates very satisfactory progress is
being made.
Launch rate predictions are still very optimistic in
the light of Space Shuttle Main Engine developmental and
spares problems, spares shortages of line replaceable
units, excessive modification workload, etc. For the next
2 to 3 years, 12 to 15 flights per year appears to be a
difficult but attainable goal.
Arrangements for transfer of functions such as
sustaining engineering, logistics management, etc., from
JSC to KSC seem to be well organized and an orderly, if
somewhat slow, transition should eventually result.
Overall safety practices and monitoring
systems—especially by the SPC—at KSC are praiseworthy
and would appear to do everything reasonable to ensure the
safety of operating personnel.
Recommendations
a. NASA management should monitor closely the effects of.
the recent reorganization at KSC to make sure that it has
accelerated and simplified management of launch
processing .
b. NASA should examine the feasibility of developing data
systems under management of the SPC, such as configuration
36
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management, that will centralize and augment KSC's
operational launch capability.
c. NASA should continue to give high priority to
acquisition of spare parts and to upgrade the reliability
(planned life) of hardware, especially items associated
with the space shuttle main engine.
d. NASA should explore whether better coordination could
be achieved between those persons determining manifests
for specific flights and those persons charged with launch
processing. In some instances, the combination of
payloads has exacerbated the launch processing sequence.
e. Facilities should be provided to minimize turnaround
times of the Shuttle and Line Replaceable Units (LRUs).
o Orbiter Maintenance and Refurbishment Facility
(OMRF) building should be authorized.
o LRU repair facilities should be provided at KSC
for all units which can be properly and
efficiently handled there.
B. Payload Interface Standardization
Findings
Shuttle turnaround times remain in the forefront of
planning for future STS flights. One of the significant
factors that affects turnaround-times is the lack of
interface standardization among the various payloads
carried into orbit. A considerable effort has been
expended in the area of standardization and the prime
example is the PAM.
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Kocomi'.iondat ions
There will always be peculiar requirements for special
payloads, but insofar as is feasible, there should be
increasing effort to preparing and carrying payloads in a
standardized fashion.
C. Extravehicular Activities (EVA)/Space Suits
Findings
This year's activities show that EVA will continue to
be in extensive use. The Leasat rescue mission is an
outstanding example of its use during the past year.
Certainly the Space Station will require extensive EVA for
its construction and for its operational activities. The
current suit continues to function well, despite its
limitations. The need remains for a more flexible suit
that has the capability of operating at a higher pressure
than the current suit.
Recommendations
NASA should continue to support the development of a
more flexible, higher pressure EVA suit and fund the
development in an appropriate manner.
D. Space Station
F i nd i ng s
The Space Station organizational structure is quite
complex, with roles and responsibilities difficult to
discern at times. The system is maturing, while there
remains some questions concerning NASA's ability to
adequately handle the systems engineering and complete
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integration of Phases C & D, the hardware and software
di.-vel opine nt. and implementation. Integrating a large
development effort, such as the Space Transportation
System, has been accomplished through an integrating
contractor and supporting contractors and NASA has not
performed a full integration role before.
Recommendations
NASA should re-examine the resources required to
conduct the many facets of the Space Station integration
effort to ensure that the organization and human resources
are sufficient to properly fill this role, now and in the
future .
F i ndings
The Space Station exists in an essentially benign
environment once on orbit when compared to the ascent-
conditions within the Orbiter payload bay.
Recommendat ions
NASA should determine possible means to alleviate the
payload bay interface environment and design requirements
(vibration, accelerations, loads) which drive some of the
Space Station element and "user" designs.
Fi nd ings
"Build-to-cost" management for the Space Station may
involve many of the same or similar activities that
confronted the Space Shuttle in its formative days.
Looking into such shuttle management and technical
activities, and the resultant decisions, could provide
Space Station management with an understanding of possible
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pitfalls to avoid, if not many positive directions to
take, thereby preventing inefficiencies in the use of
available resources.
Recommendations
NASA should establish a small team composed of current
and retired NASA/contractor persons who have first-hand
knowledge of the early activities (1972-1976) on the Space
Shuttle program. The team should define the "lessons"
that can be "learned" in both management and technical
areas, including the real possibility of using today's
technology to meet Space Station needs.
E. Aircraft Operations
Fi nd ings
There is still no head of the NASA Headquarters's
Aircraft Management Office. This precludes proper
focusing of management's attention upon achieving
centralized aircraft operational control. Agency-wide
flight operations and maintenance policy and guidelines
documents to be used by both Headquarters and the NASA
Centers have been slow in being issued.
Recommendations
NASA should appoint, as soon as possible, a qualified
operations manager as head of the Aircraft Management
Office. Determine methods to reduce the time it takes to
obtain review and approval for critical flight operations
guidelines and policies which are generated at
Headquarters.
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III. PANEL PLAN FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1986
Panel Membership
The Panel selected a new member, Dr. Harold M. Agnew, to fill
the vacancy which occurred when Herbert E. Grier retired from the
Panel. Mr. Grier remains with the Panel as a consultant. Dr.
Agnew' s experience in managing high risk, high visibility
national programs will be of great value to the Panel as it
delves deeper into the Space Station Program.
Dr. Harold M. Agnew has been in the forefront of nuclear
energy development since the early 1940s. In 1979, he joined
General Atomic Company, after serving as Director of the Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratory in New Mexico. He retired as
President from General Atomic Company on December 31, 1984. Dr.
Agnew is, among many other achievements, a Fellow of the American
Physical Society and a Fellow of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science.
Dr. Norris J. Krone, Jr. has been working with the Panel as a
consultant in the fields of aeronautics and structures,
particularly with regard to the X-29A and the X-Wing research and
development projects which NASA has been working with DARPA. Dr.
Krone, a recognized expert in his fields, is currently Executive
Director of the University of Maryland Research Foundation.
Panel Activities for 1986
The Panel's areas of interest are those which further NASA
program/project technical goals and reduce adverse events
associated with meeting those goals. Specifically, one divides
such activities into "on-going" and "new" areas of interest.
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A . On-Go ing
1. X-29A Phase IT supersonic f l i g h t envelope e x p a n s i o n ,
i n c l u d i n g ma in t enance and logistics support , f l i g h t test
plans, and crew t ra in ing .
2. X-Wing Rotor Systems Research Ai rc ra f t f l i g h t readiness
process, inc lud ing software va l ida t ion , component fa t igue
tests, powered model tes t ing, and other cer t i f ica t ion
' activit ies .
3. Space Transportation System, wi th regard to the t r ans i t i on of
ac t iv i t ies from development Centers and contractors to KSC
operators. Safe ty assurance under condi t ions of budget
reductions and increased f l u i h t rate.
4. Space Station, as it moves through Phase B into the
development and construction (Phase C & D) . Panel
ef fec t iveness depends upon early input .
5. A number of supporting areas, such as l i f e sciences, human
factors , Extra Vehicular Act iv i t ies , A i r c r a f t operat ions,
ground support equipment and fac i l i t ies , and payload
in te r faces .
B. New
1. Oblique wing research aircraft project.
2. Tether satellite project, as it interfaces with the Orbiter.
3. Orbiter "Heads-Up" ascent mode of flight, attempting to gain
additional payload capability.
4. Space debris, as it affects STS and Space Station activities.
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5. Safety impacts of any reduction of payload reoui.rements for
those who fly on the Shuttle.
6. Hazardous Material Identification and Material Safety Data as
required by statute, and its effect on NASA operations.
7. Transfer of appropriate knowledge from outside into NASA
programs to enhance safety, reliability, and maintenance
applied to a maturing Space Transportation System, and the
buildup of the Space Station.
8. Space Station Orbital Transfer Vehicle interfaces and
impacts.
9. Orbiter landing/arresting systems to preclude loss of
Orbiters due to landing site overruns or side runs.
As requested, the Panel will respond to NASA management and the
Congress regarding safety of NASA activities with due regard to
public safety at all times.
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B. AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
A C T I V [ T I E S CY 1985
DATE
1/18
1/31
2/20
3/4
3/7
3/20
4/4
SITE
1/23 Chicago
NASA Hqs
1/29-30 LaRC
NASA Hqs
2/14 NASA Hqs
Congress
2/25-26 Sikorski
2/25-27 PAFB, PL
ARC
DFRF
JSC
4/2-3 MSFC
NASA Hqs
PERSONNEL
Himmel
Donlan
All
All
Krone,
Reeder
Parmet
Reeder,
Donlan,
Parmet
All
Roth
SUBJECT
Parmet L i f e Sciences Planning Group
Space Shut t le M a i n Engine
Orbiter Upgrade (Cana rds , etc.)
Reeder X-29A and X-Wing Safety
Annual Meeting
House of Representatives Hear ing
X-Wing Review
NASA Intercenter A i r c r a f t Panel
Donlan STS Studies, Crew Training
X-29 Safety Review, R&D Operation
Bat t in STS Computers/MDMs/Software
STS Projects & Special Projects
STS 51D FRR Telecon
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4/16-18 Gen Dyn, CA Grier Phase II Centaur Safety Review
4/16-19 Db'RF Krone X-29A Activities
4/23-25 Columbia , TX McDonald Space Sta t ion Special Task Team
4/17
4/24
RI/Downey, CA Stone
Sundstrand, IL Parmet
5/9-10 KSC
Orbiter Structure Adequacy
Current/Improved Orbiter APUs
Stewart, SPC Operations for STS
Parmet
5/29
5/30
KSC
JSC
Parmet
Grier,
Himmel,
Donlan,
Parmet
Tntercenter Aircraft (Dps Panel
STS 51-1 Leasat Salvage Mission
Special Review Team
6/4
6/5
6/6
Gen Dyn, CA All
RI/Downey, CA All
Rocketdyne, CA Elverum,
Himmel,
Donlan,
Elms ,
Wil l iams
Shuttle/Centaur Mission Safety
Shutt le/Centaur, Orbiter
SSME Status (Phase 11,11+ et al)
6/6 Hughes, CA Brizendine, STS 51-1 Syncom Salvage Mission
Grier,
Himmel,
Donlan,
Parmet,
Elms,
Williams
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6/7 VAFB, CA Parmet VAFB Ac t iva t ion
6/19-20 JSC
6/19-20 VAFB, CA
7/1
7/1
Thiokol , UT Himmel
ARC
STS 51-1 Syncom Salvage Miss ionC.r i er ,
Parmet ,
Elms,
Wi l l i ams
McDonald STS System Safety Panel
Accident Invest igat ion Team
Reeder, X-Wing Safe ty Review
Krone
7/2 DFRF
7/18-19 NASA Hqs
7/22-26 ARC et al
7/30-31 JSC
8/1
8/16
8/15
8/20
MSFC
NASA Hqs
NASA Hqs
NASA Hqs
9/10-11 JSC
9/12 JSC
Reeder
Parmet
Parmet
Parmet,
Grier
Himmel
Himmel
All
X-29A Review
Life Sciences Advisory Committee
Convair 990 Invest igation Team
STS 51-1 Salvage Miss ion
Elverum, SSME Ad Hoc Review Team
Himmel
Elverum, SSME Ad Hoc Review Team
Himmel
STS 51-1 Fl ight Readiness Review
Propellant Accident Team Report
Space Station, Special STS Topics
Parmet, STS Safety, Quality Assurance
McDonald
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9/17-19 ARC, DFRF Reeder X-29 Act iv i t i es
9/24-25 KSC Roth Level I Centaur Management Review
10/2-4 Sikorski Krone X-Wing Safe ty
10/9-10 KSC Stewart,
Parmet,
McDonald
STS Operations en toto, JSC to
KSC Transition, KSC/VAFB Efforts
10/23 NASA Hqs Roth STS 61A Nose Wheel Steering
10/28-30 JSC Reeder Orbiter Concerns, Space Station
10/29-31 TWA, KS Parmet ,
Roth
Intercenter Aircraf t Ops Panel
11/19 Rocketdyne, CA Elverum, SSME Update
Himmel
11/19-21 LaRC Parmet A i r c r a f t Ops Safety Review Team
11/20-21 Gen Dyn ,CA Grier,
Himmel
Centaur Design Certification Rev
11/21 NASA Hqs Br izend ine , Space Stat ion Management Review
Donlan
11/22 VAFB, CA McDonald Level I Design Cert. Review
12/4-5 VAFB, CA All Shuttle Operations - USAF
12/10 MSFC Elverum SRB/FWC, SSME,Composites
12/11 NASA Hqs Roth STS 61-C FRR
12/19 RI/Downey, CA Stone Orbiter Systems Update
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PANEL REPORT ON SYNCOM SALVAGE MISSION
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NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington, DC.
20546 June 28, 1985
Reply to Ann of LB/GLK
TO: A/Administrator
M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight
FROM: LB/Staff Director, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
SUBJECT: Safety Assessment of the Leasat/Syncom Salvage Mission (STS 51-1)
INTRODUCTION
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel was requested to assess the safety of
the plans and implementation to salvage the Leasat/Syncom now 1n orbit on
the STS 51-1 mission. A preliminary assessment was provided by memo dated
June 11, 1985. This report is the Panel's final assessment. There may be
further comments as a result of the upcoming mission operations certification
review scheduled for July 30-Aug 1 at JSC.
The Panel team included Norm Parmet, Herb Grier, Charlie Donlan, Sey Himmel
and Gil Roth with support from Walt Williams and Jim Elms. The following
activities were conducted:
May 30 JSC Hazard analyses, EVA, handling hardware, interfaces
Jun 5 Rockwell Orbiter operations
Jun 6 Hughes Leasat failure cause, vehicle state, salvage safety
Jun 19-20 JSC Phase III Safety Review, hardware OCR
This was, by necessity, a limited review with the objective of ascertaining the
adequacy of salvage mission management, Leasat status now and at the time of the
mission, hardware design, crew operations, mission rules, risk analyses as they
all affect mission safety.
ASSESSMENT
Safety first then mission success are the priorities for the salvage operation.
Both NASA and Hughes have explored and reviewed the salvage task thoroughly
and appear to have practical and safe plans for Us implementation. Mission
simulations at both JSC and Hughes facilities have been and continue to be
conducted to replicate each task and step to be taken, including contingency
modes. To date there is nothing that represents a source of significant concern
with regard to safety. It should be safe to proceed with the mission assuming*'
nothing negative arises from the final reviews to affect the safe operation as
we see It now.
We would like to re-emphasize the following: (1) mission rules, now 1n work,
must be clear, concise and complete to assure such things as proper checkout of
the many electronic boxes in the cabin and no EVA missteps, (2) assure overlap
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of JSC and Hughes activities so that nothing can drop-through-the-crack. The
continuing working group meetings and reviews should assure this, (3) the
spacecraft attitude, spin rate and internal state are not fully known, therefore,
analyses of these conditions must continue so that their affects on the mission
can be factored into the plans and implementation, (4) 1f the adverse tolerance
buildup theory for failure of the Leasat is correct, it illustrates once again
how little things can be the cause of major problems, therefore, no matter how
simple or mundane a thing is it can not be overlooked.
FAILURE MECHANISM
Having proved by the STS 51-D "flyswatter" operation that the most probable single
point failure probably did not cause the Leasat malfunction, Hughes looked care-
fully into multiple failure scenarios. By analysis and test they found that a
dual failure of the Perigee Kick Motor (PKM) separation switches was the most
credible failure due to a design deficiency caused by structure warpage and
insufficient switch plunger length, see attached figure. In this case the Post
Ejection Sequencer (PES) would never be powered. The proposed salvage operation
is based on working around the PKM separation switches and providing inhibits
and allowing for ground control (not internal spacecraft) of spacecraft activation.
SAFETY AND MISSION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
The salvage activities make use of JSC and Hughes designed and built equipment
to meet specific demands of Leasat handling and attitude control, vehicle safing,
internal system modification, and redeploy. The original STS payload safety
requirements based on NASA's NHB 1700./A were provided and approved December 1983.
These requirements have been reexamined and updated June 14, 1985 to meet the
salvage mission requirements. Items considered "open" because they are still
in work and will be completed by the end of July 1985 are: Hardware Picture Book,
Details of Cabin Checkout Box, In-Cabin Checkout Procedures, EVA Operational
Procedures, and Completion of Unit and System Test Program,
JSC developed procedures for the mission, EVA equipment, crew training and
interfacing with Hughes show a thorough understanding of crew/orbttfir safety
needs. Crew training in Ig and neutral buoyancy facilities at both JSC and
Hughes (using Leasat F-5) should preclude complacency between now and the
mission, and allows for the necessary "back-out" modes, if such are required.
Visual cues during the salvage operations will provide positive indications
of the spacecraft condition, i.e., omni antenna deploy, vehicle spin-up, in
addition to any X-band transmissions. Any of these would result in mission abort.
The Hughes built equipment, once installed, will safe the vehicle by (1)
locking the separation switch lever in the closed position thereby opening
the cradle separation switches, (2) installing shorting plugs to inhibit any.
Internal spacecraft event initiation and allowing only ground commanded initiation,
(3) insertion of safe and arm safing pins.
Sneak circuit analyses are being conducted on critical circuits and show no
concerns to date. We have been assured that through configuration control that
the "as-built" configuration is known. The external configuration is known (unlike
the previous on-orbit retrieve/repair missions). Problems associated with on-board
propellents (particularly the hypergolics) have been Investigated and tests performed.
These indicate no safety concerns based on statements made by both JSC and Hughes.
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D. F^CT-FINDING RESULTS OF CALENDAR YF.AR 1985
1 . Space Transportation System (STS)
a . Orbiter
There have been surprisingly few crisis-type hardware
issues. In fact, the major hardware problem is lack of
spares that leads to cannibal ization . We have dealt with
this separately under logistics.
There is one item, though, that warrants review and
that is the fuel cell. The bank of cells is fully
redundant in a come-home emergency sense, but the mission
power loads are high enough that there is not complete
redundancy in a mission-power sense. The basic electric
power source should be unquestionable. The fuel cell
problems have not been fundamental but seem to have been
valves, heaters, and the like. This subject is worthy of
review to assure the design of these accessories is, in
fact, conservative.
Five areas associated with the Orbiter have received
most of the Panel's attention: Structural adequacy,
avionics hardware and software, brake/steering behavior,
landing handling qualities, and the use of automatic
systems (such as autobraking and autolanding) .
(1 ) Orbiter Structural Adequacy and Certification Program
The structural life certification program for the
Orbiter has been proven by approximately 33 fatigue,
fracture, and acoustic supplemental tests, as well as
analysis of outboard elevon/f lapper-door/wing portion of
the rear spar. The last remaining wing root fatigue and
fracture analysis has been started, but will not be
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completed due to lack of funding at this time. It is
recognized that the Orbiter is designed for only 100
missions with a scatter factor of four and approximately a
30,000 PSI tension stress level in the lower wing skin. By
examining current available fatigue spectra data one can
conclude that the fatigue damage is negligible, fracture
damage and acoustic loads small. However, in order to have
a complete structural life certification program, a short
cut analysis should be made and documented.
The calculated ASKA 6.0 (latest loads/stress program)
stresses are lower than the stresses from flight test
results at wing strain gage locations AB and A14 for 85%
launch probability. At this time, it is not practical to
revise aero loads, so an additional loading is applied to
the wing, known as a "collector force." This added force
simulates stresses at wing locations AB and A14 which
appear to be slightly conservative on some of the other
wing/carry thru structure. The final ASKA 6.0 loads will
contain this collector load. The remaining external
loads/ internal loads work consists of:
(a) additional landing cases - matrix of sink speed vs
gross weight.
(b) replace high Q boost loads with a set of Q loads which
include "collector load" increments for wing and carry-thru
structure .
(c) internal loads- fuselage side without hatch.
Entry internal loads are expected to be completed by
February 1986. However, the remainder of the stress
analysis and thermal protection subsystem structural
analysis is to be completed on schedule, September 1987.
All original sets of loads, including high dynamic pressure
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(0) during ascent, will be used to analyze the fuselage and
tail surfaces. The structural thermal gradients used have
a hiqh degree of confidence based on flight test results
and a significant boef up in the mid-fusel ago structure
resulted from flight test dat.i.
The final check of the wing loads/stresses will be
verified by pressure gages and strain gages applied to the
OV-102 vehicle. However, it should be noted that a loads
calibration program will not be conducted on the Orbiter
wing, but may be required if the flight results are
questionable.
Since the ASKA 6.0 loads/stress program is to be
finished within an allocated budget and time duration, only
the primary load path structure (wing, fuselage, tail, and
thermal protection subsystem analysis) will be completely
documented. Other structural components, e.g., the crew
module, will not be well documented.
With regard to redlines and specific Orbiter
modifications, it is noted that to meet an 85% launch
probability the following modifications are required, based
on extrapolation from flight data:
Mod. I. 8 bolts replaced, wing station X = 1307 upper,
for all vehicles.
3 bolts replaced, wing station X = 1191 lower,
for all vehicles.
Wing station Y = 123, rib cap doublers,
for OV^103,104.
Mod. IT Wing station X = 1191, external doubler lower
for all vehicles.
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Mod III (using collector load concept)
o Wing station X = 1249,
spar web vert, stiffener OV-103,104
o Wing station X = 1307,
spar web vert, stiffener OV-103,104
o Add doublers inboard access hole all vehicles
o Wing station X = 1191,
upper cover finger doubler all vehicles
o Upper surface external doubler
Proximity of wing station X = 1307 OV-103,104
Aft wing station X = 1307 all vehicles
Inside mid-fuselage carry-thru OV-103,104
o Wing station X = 1249 access hole doubler OV-103,104
(Note: These modifications should be the end of any required
wing mods. However, there are still two critical items to be
evaluated, i.e., the results from the instrumented OV-102 flight
test and final 6.0 loads/stress analysis.)
( 2 ) New Avionics Hardware/Software
The Panel has been monitoring three major upgrades for
the avionics system of the Shuttle Orbiter — the MMU (Mass
Memory Unit), the CPU (Central Processor Unit), and the
IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit).
(a) Mass Memory Units
NASA is upgrading the MMUs by adding one card to the
tape unit to implement error-correcting codes and to
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m o d i f y the w r i t e head — the la t te r because they have
exper ienced a r ead -wr i t e head wear p r o b l e m . Seve ra l have
f a i l e d on the q round but f o r t u n a t e l y none have f a i l e d in
f l igh t .
The MMU tape drive is used to change mission phases by
loading new programs into the f l igh t computers. The most
critical program — namely, the shuttle entry program—is
loaded from the MMU into one on-board computer. This load
can be, theoretically, accomplished from the ground but
the process is slow and has never actually been tried.
For a mission abort, the MMU must be used to load the
ent ry program and is, t h e r e f o r e , a c r i t ica l f l i g h t - s a f e t y
item. Gran ted , i t would requi re mul t ip le f a i l u r e s ( f i r s t ,
an abor t , and second, an MMU f a i l u r e ) but the consequences
are unacceptable.
The Panel supports the upgrade. However, the cost and
schedule (18 months to two years) require NASA's
cont inuing attention.
( b) Central Processor/Input Output Units
Today, each f l igh t computer, consisting of a CPU plus
an TOP, uses magnet ic core technology and has
approximately 104,000 words of 32 bits each. Its speed is
400,000 operations per second. Each box ( t he CPU and the
TOP) weighs 60 pounds and the combinat ion consumes 600
watts of power.
The Panel supports the decision to replace the shuttle
computers with those which IBM will be supplying the Air
Force for the B-l bomber (1000 machines) and the F-15
fighter (700 machines ) . Although IBM would, of course,
o
continue to provide logistic support for the old shuttle
computers by keeping a special line open, NASA would be
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the only customer and the cost to NASA could be
unreasonable.
The new computers are smaller, faster, lighter, use
less power, and have greater capacity. Each of the new
computers weighs 60 pounds (half of the original),
provides 256,000 words of memory, executes 1,200,000
operations per second, and consumes 525 watts. With the
Air Force as the significant customer, NASA will have
logistic support at a fraction of what it would cost if
they were to continue with the current shuttle computers.
The NASA versions of the new flight computers are more
expensive than those for the Air Force since NASA requires
that all parts are to be manufactured in the USA where
NASA, through IBM, will be able to directly witness,
monitor, and control the processes. This is essential for
a flight critical item and it seems odd to the Panel that
the Air Force does not demand the same.
Although IBM assures NASA that no changes will be
required in the applications software, the Panel
recommends that NASA monitor this carefully. Applications
software can be expensive to change and retest.
The new computers are scheduled for the middle of 1987
and NASA already has one computer operating in Houston at
the IBM laboratory with the new FCOS (flight computer
operating system) in place. The old machine has been
operating with the necessary software changes to the
operating system since January 1985. Now it is in the new
computer. NASA has reactivated the GN&C test station to
demonstrate the transparency of the new machine to the
applications software.
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The new computer has new codes and the t empta t ion w i l l
be great to use them to " i m p r o v e " the appl ica t ions
sof tware . To discourage this human fo ib le , the sof tware
compiler will not recognize the new codes. The Panel is
concerned that this discipl ine cannot be i n d e f i n i t e l y
mainta ined . It was tried without success in the Apollo
program .
NASA plans to buy 24 f l i g h t and 6 non- f l igh t
computers. For logistics, NASA plans to order one new
computer each year af ter the ini t ial purchase. The Panel
questions the adequacy of this decision since the lack of
spares has always been a s ign i f i can t problem.
( c) Inert ial Measurement Uni t s
The upgrading of the IMUs follows a similar pattern.
Singer will provide new IMUs wi th superior performance and
at lower cost. The main customer for the new
instruments—Bear Claw and the B-l — will provide NASA the
opportunity to eliminate the costly dedicated
m a n u f a c t u r i n g l ine m a i n t a i n e d for i ts use only.
Furthermore, these ins t ruments are also expected to be
transparent to the shuttle system. In fac t , they can even
operate as a mixed set—both old and new machines . NASA
does not need the improved performance, but will have it
as a by-product without changing their specif icat ions.
The new IMU has its own microprocessor which can be an
advantage during the prelaunch operation. With the proper
software in the IMU processor, any last minute hold-time
due to a d r i f t i n g IMU could be el iminated. Today, as much
as 1 1/2 hours of hold-time can occur for such a problem.
The new instruments are lighter--120 pounds versus 175
pounds — and they use less power. The Panel supports the
acquisi t ion of this new technology.
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(3) Brakes/Nose Wheel Steering
In the Orbi ter ( shu t t l e ) landing rollout improvement
program, the nose wheel s teer ing system has been m o d i f i e d
to provide l inear response for the f i r s t r> degrees of the
9 degrees total au tho r i t y w i t h la tera l acce le ra t ion
feedback for smoothing through the general purpose
computer ( G P C ) and is active upon l and ing . Fa i lu re of the
GPC results in reversion to the parabolic response d i rec t
mode. Results have been sat isfactory. However , 9 degrees
maximum may not be enough. In the usual case, cross winds
are never steady in speed or d i rec t ion . Thus , the cross
wind component wi l l never be known ahead of t ime for the
moment of touchdown or d u r i n g rollout. Landing wind
conditions in case of abort a f t e r launch would be the
hardest to allow for in planning because of the low
probabi l i ty of such an event and an i nde t e rmina t e l and ing
site. It is un l ike ly that winds would be w i t h i n stated
l imits at all possible land ing sites at any one t ime.
Also, landing procedure calls for off loading the ma in
landing gear by put t ing the elevens down af ter nose wheel
contact. This , of course, reduces the b rak ing and
steering capabil i ty with brakes on rollout, and puts
greater dependence on nose wheel steering. Wi th these
considerations, it would seem that the m a x i m u m nose wheel
steering angle ought to be increased to 15-20 degrees to
deal with high crosswinds, blown tires, inadvertent
departure from the hard-surface runway, or a case where
d r i f t or skid exceeds the angular limits of the nose
wheel, thus leading to possible "groundloop" about the
nose wheel. One guest ion remains at this t ime: W i l l the
nose wheel steering system allow for free-castor ing if it
goes to a hardover posi t ion, that is, a f a i l - s a fe ,
fai l-operational condition?
40
A carbon brake review was conducted by NASA in early
December 1985 and resulted in agreement to procure a
carbon brake system for the Orbiter and to obtain the
system from the current Orbiter brake supplier. There is
concern by the STS management about the availability of
resources to support the development of the carbon brakes,
given the many competing requirements and the projected
constrained budqet during the 1986 period. The program
management considers the development of the carbon brake
system to be of the highest pr iority . . .and the Panel
supports this position as it has in the past.
(4 ) Landing Handling Qualities
Looking to the future, the concerns with landing
handling qualities of the Orbiter which result from the
tailless design featuring a low aspect ratio wing and
large elevens for longitudinal and lateral control may be
corrected through the use of control augmentation devices
or surface. This would result in lower landing speeds and
improvements in handling qualities. If possible, it would
behoove NASA to undertake such a research program with the
view of furnishing timely information for future designs
of the shuttle type, including possible flight tests of a
research- type vehicle at either Ames or Langley Research
Centers .
( 5 ) Automation
Automated landings, while still in the program, have
not been demonstrated and are not in favor with the
current pilot astronauts. They question the system's
reliability and prefer a "hands-on" landing capability.
However, it would appear that since landings at KSC are
deemed mandatory to reduce the turnaround times between
missions, the use of the automated system might well be
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needed to assure meet ing the f1iqhts-per-year goal. An
incongru i ty appears to exis t here in tha t the L a u n c h and
ascent por t ion of the mi s s ion is a l r eady f u l l y automated
and been found to be extremely reliable throughout . The
quest ion that arises is: Tf the f l i g h t system for ascent
is rel ied upon , then why not the f l i g h t system for
land inq?
b. Space Shutt le Main Engine
By 1983 there was s u f f i c i e n t data to show that the
m a i n engines were being operated near their tolerable
margin l imi t s at 104%, and that s i g n i f i c a n t improvements
were necessary to permit more than very limited use at the
desired 109% of rated power. As reported last year , a
three-phase proqram was de f ined to address the extensive
mod i f i c a t i ons necessary to improve both opera t ing stress
m a r g i n s and l i f e l i m i t i n g wear charac te r i s t i cs . F u n d i n g
c o n s t r a i n t s in 1984, and c o n t i n u i n g in 1985 and for the
foreseeable f u t u r e , have revised the p lanned program. The
re s t ruc tu red program retained the Phase I and Phase TT
port ions to d e f i n e exis t ing component l i f e and to improve
wearout l i f e of the turbo-machinery at both 104% and 109%
by decreasing the High Pressure Fuel Turbopump turbine
discharge tempera ture 100°, and by increasing the
synchronous whir l margin on the Oxidizer Turbopump by at
least 5000 RPM.
The Phase III part of the original program was
el iminated and replaced by several other program elements.
One of these, labeled Phase TI -P lus , w i l l develop and
c e r t i f y a new hot-gas m a n i f o l d s t r uc tu r e . This new
m a n i f o l d w i l l be designed to lower the m a n i f o l d p r e s s u r e
drop, decrease local peak temperature zones, and improve
overall hot-gas f low u n i f o r m i t y .
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A d d i t i o n a l l y , potential engine improvements for the
f u t u r e are being studied in a series of tasks labeled the
Test Bed Precursor Program. This ac t iv i ty wi l l develop a
single coil heat exchanger, an improved inlet
conf igura t ion for the High-Power Oxid izer Turbopump,
removal of all b a f f l e s from the main in jector , and a large
diameter throat con f igu ra t ion for the m a i n combustion
chamber. This wil l also evaluate f u r t h e r component l i f e
extensions by m i n i m i z i n g the start-up and shut-down
transient high temperatures.
Beyond these def ined but limited tasks to improve
known low-margin areas of the exist ing engine des ign,
there is a new product improvement ac t iv i ty getting
underway. This activity will seek new concepts for
various cri t ical components or subsystems such as the
turbopumps. The objective would be to make major
improvements in operating stress margin and/or component
wearout l i f e . This long-range improvement ac t iv i ty may
involve other rocket engine companies in add i t ion to
Rocke'tdyne. The Panel s trongly supports this type of
a c t i v i t y because of its leverage on improved re l iab i l i ty
at high power levels ( 1 0 9 % ) and its potential for improved
miss ion performance ( > 1 0 9 % ) .
As of late November 1985, the Phase II program had
resulted in many improvements which are now incorporated
into the two Cer t i f ica t ion Engines. Of these, several of
the most important are:
o High Pressure Fuel Pump turbine discharge temperature
was reduced about 100°R-
o Operating l i fe (no c racks) on both the f i r s t and second
stage tu rb ine blades of the fue l turbopumps was
improved by thermal ba r r i e r coatings.
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o A margin oE almost 7000 RPM was achieved on the High
Pressure OxidLzer Turbopump.
o "Life" improvements were made in various other
components such as liftoff seals, bearings, sheet metal
cases, etc.
On the other hand, several of the planned
modifications did not work out, particularly on the
oxidizer turbopump. As a result, component life
limitations still exist in these areas and will continue
to present replacement problems. Therefore, engine use at
109% of rated thrust should still be tightly constrained.
Two Phase IT engines will run a kind of "composite
certification" program. The results of these tests will
be to demonstrate "service life" for various parts of the
engine, and indicate a re placement- time schedule for the
turbopumps , including even replacement schedules for
components of the turbopumps. The basic certification
program on each engine will be at a mix of 104% and 109%
thrust mission profiles. Of the 10,000 seconds of
operation (egual to 20 mission durations), approximately
40% will be run at 109% of rated power. It was hoped to
demonstrate 5-flight capability on the turbomachinery (10
mission tests for 5000 seconds). However, parts were
changed on the oxidizer pumps, and a weld crack repair
done on a fuel pump which then subseguently is to
accumulate 'SOOO seconds. Furthermore, the oxidizer
turbopump turbine blades will clearly limit usage to well
below 5 missions until the two-piece damper blades can be
incorporated in a certification extension program.
The Panel's assessment is that the Phase II engines
are fully capable of the 109% for the planetary missions.
However, the certification groundrules which permit
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replacements of various components such as turbopumps or
blades, etc. , d u r i n g test series resul t in a somewhat
questionable data base regarding t rue engine
"configurat ion" operating margins and valid
mean-time-between-replacement values. This results f rom
the unknown impact of m i x i n g components wi th var ious
w e a r l i f e histories. The Panel still believes, there fore ,
that operation at 109% should be l imi ted to only those
missions where it is manda tory , and that engines be
care fu l ly evaluated a f t e r such a f l i gh t . The MPT runs to
date had gone up to 106%. There were no indications of
incipient f low instabili t ies proximate to changes of state
or two-phase f low. The JSC engineering s t a f f , a f t e r
careful review of the data from the ear l ier tests, feels
conf ident that a 3 point extrapolation in f low rate can be
made w i t h conf idence. The Panel supports the three-engine
m a i n propulsion system tests at the Nat iona l Space
Technology Laboratories ( N S T L ) , which were scheduled to be
completed before any f l i g h t is carried out at Full Power
Levels.
The Panel review and tour of the SSME f a c i l i t y at
Canoga Park were ve ry encouraging. The near-term
a v a i l a b i l i t y of this fac i l i ty , wi th its dedicated special
equipment , discipl ined procedures, and management focus,
should improve s ign i f i can t ly the timely ava i l ab i l i t y and
re l iabi l i ty of fu ture engines and replacement subsystems.
However, unless the new hardware is made avai lab le to
support a more conservative mean-time-be fore-replacement
schedule on the critical components c u r r e n t l y showing wide
scatter in l i f e t i m e , the "cann iba l i za t ion" and "parts
m i x i n g " which now go on wil l seriously l imi t the value and
ef fec t iveness o f . t h i s fac i l i ty .
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c . S o l i d Rocket: Boosters
The steel case Solid Rocket Boosters have been
pe r fo rming as expected Cor each of the Space
Transpor ta t ion System f l i g h t s conducted this year ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
There have been component/system anomalies such as the
H y d r a u l i c Power Uni t ( H P U ) tu rb ine overspeed on STS 61-C
which caused a pad shutdown. Nonetheless the ground
launch system reacted proper ly and the required change-out
of hardware was made. P e r f o r m a n c e ( b u r n i n g t ime, th rus t
vs. t ime, motor pressures) has been close to predicted
each f l i g h t . SRB recovery systems, w i t h some except ions,
con t inue to a l low for recovery wi th l i t t l e damage.
In response to the Panel ' s recommendat ion , the solid
rocket Motors are being 100% x-ray inspected, on a
periodic basis, to assure that the proper propel. lant
process and qua l i ty controls are m a i n t a i n e d dur ing the
case loading.
The f i l a m e n t wound case ( FWC ) project Design
C e r t i f i c a t i o n Review (OCR) was conducted November 18,
1985. The f i r s t f l i gh t wil l be STS 62-A using the
Vandenberg Air Force Base launch pad system, now scheduled
for mid - Ju ly 1986. There are a number: of "gates" to be
completed pr ior to the Fl ight Readiness F i r i n g ( F R F ) w h i c h
takes place at the VLS in June 1986 in readiness for the
f i r s t launch. Some of the more s i g n i f i c a n t are:
(1) The FWC STA-2 ( s t ruc tu ra l test a r t i c l e ) was tested for
pre launch loads and fa i led at 118.4% of l imi t load. The
f a i l u r e mode was not properly i d e n t i f i e d and is receiving
f u r t h e r s tudy. However, the load was not applied to take
into cons idera t ion j o i n t eccentr ic i ty nor was the test
art icle representa t ive of the VLS-I. f i l a m e n t wound f l i g h t
ar t ic le . There are process des ign d i f f e r e n c e s between STA-2
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and VLS-1, i.e., use of Plast ilock , no time limit, for tying
down helical ends, and use of. substrate glass hoops in lieu
of graphite cloth.
STA-2B will be conducted with a new skirt, new forward
and aft case, and FWC like the VLS-1 flight article. It will
be tested to 140% of limit load during April 1986. In
addition, the forward dome joint ultimate pressure and linQ
load applied at the joint will be tested during that same
time. • It is expected that FWC cavity collapse crushing
loads will be tested during July 1986. Increased SRB skirt
pre launch loads have been properly identified including load
alleviation options.
(2) Filament wound case DM-7 firing showed that at about 80
seconds there was significant thrust oscillation. This
requires further analysis to determine the cause and whether
there would be any impact on actual flight.
(3) A search is underway for an insulation replacement since
the use of asbestos is no longer legal. This is a real
concern which may alter the known SRM characteristics.
The lift-off loads affecting the Solid Rocket Booster
when launched from the Vandenberg site are estimated to be
significantly above the "safe limit" at this time. The
prediction methods for prelaunch loads and excursions have
been validated by reconstruction analysis. The causes of
increased Solid Rocket Booster prelaunch loads have been
identified as: transient peak bending moment due to SSME
ignition, FWC flexibility amplifying dynamic overshoot, and
wind and stacking effects. Several load alleviation options
have been identified to provide the needed load reduction.
Of these, the one selected is to shim the outboard pad
support posts that support the total stack through their
attachment to the SRB aft skirt. Additional options, such as
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placarding west wind velocity, are available. It if it
decided to change the SSME start sequence to alleviate the
SRB laods there might be a requirement for redefinition of
payload bay/cargo interface loads as well.
d. E x t e r n a l Tank
The External Tank appears to have little, if any,
problems in its role as fuel tank for the Space Shuttle Main
Engines. The suspected problem with SOFI tank insulation
coining off and impacting the Orbiter at liftoff and during
ascent has been eliminated through the use of thousands of
holes to preclude adverse pressure difference across the
insulation.
There are studies looking at reducing the External Tank
weight through judicious removal of metal throughout. This
work, based on flight data to date, appears reasonable.
However, any reduction in design margins must be carefully
studied and understood. The possibility of shell buckling
must be kept in mind as was done several years ago during a
major weight reduction program.
e. Launch Sites/Vehicle Processing/Logistics
(1 ) VAFB Launch Complex Development (VLS)
The Panel has been observing the VLS development during
the year and was present at the Design Certification Review
(DCR) Level I Board meeting, and at the earlier Level II and
associated Subsystem Safety Reviews. Excellent working
relationships between USAF and NASA personnel are apparent
and the progressive resolution of developmental problems in
the engineering and construction tasks constitute an
impressive overall performance.
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The Pa no I notes the d e l a y in the o f f i c i a l l a u n c h i l a t e Cot
STS-62A from March 1 to m i d - J u l y 1986 and views th i s as being
very advantageous from the aspects of sa fe ty and readiness.
The Flight Readiness Fir ing ( F R F ) program wi l l serve to
resolve many remaining problems and add confidence in launch
safety. Two major tasks still require resolution, namely,
the system for ensuring safe burn-off of residual hydrogen in
the SSME exhaust duct and the ve r i f i ca t ion of actual launch
mount loads on the pad, which are being pursued vigorously.
Shims have been added at the launch pad SRB hold-down posts
to adjus t vehicle loads. The hold-down bolt ca l ibra t ion and
joint f ree play tests wi l l be conducted d u r i n g a pul l test of
the two SRBs. It is f e l t that the loads on the compression
side w i l l be large enough to g ive good resu l t s ; however , the
tension side which has combined compression and tension loads
may not be large enough for good cal ibra t ion data . Since
combined loads and not uni-axial loads wil l be applied, it
wi l l be d i f f i c u l t to separate out the various load component
e f f e c t s . These tests are scheduled for the end of the f i r s t
quarter of 1986.
Final integrated loads analyses, Cycle III pre launch and
l i f t off loads are close to those previously calculated,
adding conf idence to the predic t ions .
Problems associated w i t h the very compact n a t u r e of the
VLS when compared wi th KSC have been e x p l o r e d , for e x a m p l e ,
the provision of an ice suppression system to p r e c l u d e
external tank ice-up pr ior to l aunch ; e l i m i n a t i o n of possible
re-ingestion of exhaust gases into air c o n d i t i o n i n g and other
systems; and analysis of exhaust and f l a r e -o f f f lame
temperatures upon the cryogenics storage tanks .
Qua l i t y control procedures in construct ion and systems seem
to have adequate a t tent ion and there exists great sens i t iv i ty
towards this subject fo l lowing some of the cr i t ic isms which
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were aired publicly in the summer of 1984. The comprehensive
review and sign-off procedures between NASA and USAF for
desiqn certification and operational readiness leave the
Panel with the comfortable feeling that considerations
towards thoroughness and safety are paramount.
The Program organizational, staffing and personnel,
planning, and training elements appear to be sound and
providing the needed strengths to achieve program goals. The
test program, including the FRF, appears thorough and one
which will pay dividends in successful future launches. And,
finally, the cooperative teamwork between the USAF and NASA
at the VLS is highly evident and, the Panel believes, a great
strength in the national space effort. There are two
additional observations which the Panel would note: (1) the
7-day work week, success-oriented schedule, which carries
certain risks; (2) over the long term of future launches at
VLS, orderly success will depend, in large part, upon
retention of a stable, experienced launch team. The Panel
urges USAF consideration of a personnel assignment policy
which will ensure that future capability.
KSC involvement in VLS operations is detailed in the SPC
"STS IV. Launch Team Support Plan." Tt outlines KSC support
of VLS and is a commitment of the reguired resources. The
plan calls for regular coordination between KSC and VLS
counterparts to the extent that each understands the other's
status, problems, and concerns. The SPC is in the process of
identifying the reguired KSC personnel by name. At this
stage one can only assume the plan will work as described.
The Panel's continued assessment of the launch processing
activities at Kennedy Space Center and preparation for the
initial launch in 1986 at Vandenberg Air Force Base includes
the long-standing concern with the logistics of the Space
Transportation System.
(2) KSC Operations
Last year in its annual, report the Panel note*} that the
Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) was struggling to handle
the burden of work associated with each mission. Factors
associated with these difficulties included: unplanned
vehicle modifications, unexpected anomalies, shortage of
spare parts, shortage of qualified technicians, heavy
paperwork burden, planning and communication concerns, and
some lack of hardware reliability. The past year has seen
progress in resolving these problems but most of them are
still present in some degree and will likely persist for the
foreseable future, thereby limiting the extent of
"operational" status the STS is likely to achieve.
Specifically:
(a) SPC Performance. The SPC is improving its internal
planning and operations through better communication within
the SPC operation and with KSC and other NASA centers.
Presence of SPC representatives at the centers has helped
considerably. Workflow at the VAB and the pad seems under
control. However, the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF)
capacity will have to be increased if the projected flight
rate for 1987-1988 is to be achieved. Data systems to
provide a common base of information around which to schedule
the flow are still being developed, for example, all
configuration management systems are outside the SPC's
control and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
Unplanned modifications now require only about 5% to 8% of
the processing time, a considerable improvement; however,
about 35% of the time is still devoted to responding to
unplanned tests or change-outs resulting from flight concerns
and anomalies.
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(b) H a r d w a r e . The major processing problem is s t i l l , the
unpredic tabi l i ty and un re l i ab i l i t y of p r inc ipa l f l i g h t and
ground items, which is not a problem the SPC can address on
its own.
(c) Spares. The advent of At lan t i s (OV-104) in service means
that , in the short term, the spare parts problem will be more
d i f f i c u l t since it wil l be harder to cann ib i l i ze needed
parts. NASA's spares acquisi t ion is receiving a great deal
of at tent ion but the shortages wil l exist for months and
probably years.
(d) KSC and SPC Reorgan iza t ions . Both the SPC (in May) and
KSC (in October) announced reorganizat ions and changes in
personnel towards the shared objective of evolving a more
"operat ional" organizat ion.
In addi t ion , agreement was reached on s h i f t i n g
responsibi l i ty for orbiter sustaining engineer ing and
logistics f r o m JSC to KSC. However, as expected, the sh i f t
to a truly "operational" STS will still be gradual and
evolu t ionary .
(e) Fl ight rate. Given existing constraints--hardware,
spares, m o d i f i c a t i o n s , absence of data systems, m a n i f e s t i n g
d i f f i cu l t i e s - - t he goal of 18 f l ights per year is not w i t h i n
reach at present. A more realistic goal is between 12 and 15
per year. The best composite time to date (best t i m e at each
fac i l i ty , OFF, VAB, Pad) is 44 days. KSC hopes to reduce it
to 35 days in the near term and, h o p e f u l l y to 28 days
eventual ly (goa l ) . One fact is increasingly evident :
sophisticated payloads result in long occupancy times in the
OPF. Centaur , in pa r t i cu la r , is very time consuming in this
regard. Such faci l i t ies as the Orbiter Maintenance and
Repair Facility (OMRF) wil l help ease the load in the OPF.
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(1) Logistics Management
The logistics management responsibility transfer to KSC
should be complete by 1988 with JSC retaining control of
flight software and avionics, aero loads and thermal analysis
and major system upgrades. A KSC/RT Downey contract will be
executed on or about January 1986 puttinq the new
arrangements for logistics and sustaining engineering into
effect. Included in this program is a plan for RI to develop
full TPS shops at KSC by March 1987 using Lockheed and RI
tile-making techniques.
The entire spares program is being "restructured" to
comply with budget restraints. The premise here appears to
be that, since the spares provisioning was actually
structured for 24 flights/year, it can be tailored downward
for 15-18 f1ights/year with minimal effect until 1991. A
significant element of this restructuring is the use of
planned cannibalization and the identification of high-value
critical spares items.
A continuing and full-blown effort is needed to upgrade
Line Replaceable Units (LRU's). Many LRU's today continue to
create serious logistic problems because of extremely limited
lives and/or a degree of unreliability. These situations
may, in the long run, limit turnaround times and thus the
number of flights per year. In the case of extremely high
risk designs, NASA should plan ahead by early budgeting of
funds for product improvement programs instead of waiting
until serious problems exist.
The Panel understands that limited budgetary allocations
are forcing another assessment of spares procurements.
Today, cannibalization is a prime means by which many spares
are provided. Today, STS 103 is the major "spare parts bin."
Because of deferral of initial flight out of Vandenberg, this
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vehicle is being cannibalized of LRU's to use on other
vehicles. What crisis will develop in six months when these
units are needed for first fliqht out of Vandenberg?
Finally, there has to be a minimum allocation of spare
units to permit the planned number of flights. Reducing the
allocation of spares to fit the budget is going at the
problem backwards. If, however, this sort of action becomes
a fact of life, then realistic planning should be
accomplished to establish the number of missions that can
realistically be flown based on such curtailments. The
number of missions should be based on real capability.
An SPC safety awards program has been instituted and
various mishap, incident and safety alert programs have been
established. Safety alert programs exist in each directorate
and a suggestion program has been .implemented. Some 4,000
SPC employees have now received safety indoctrination and
training. A corporate level Safety Advisory Board has been
working with KSC and VAFB organizations to further assure STS
safety.
2. Shuttle/Centaur
It is quite apparent that the problem of mating the
successful Centaur (an unmanned design) with the manned Shuttle
was underestimated by everyone. The extent of the changes to
Centaur to be compatible with the redundancy and safety
requirements of the manned Shuttle are such that new
qualification and certification testing is required in many
component and subsystem cases. This testing is occurring late in
the program and may well be the most critical problem in meeting
the schedule. The lateness, it turns out, is not so much a
result of technical problems but rather of the initial decision
to treat the Centaur as a payload, independent of the Shuttle.
Much of the electronic hardware is late owing to problems with
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parts l ike the relays and in acquisi t ion of hi-rel solid state
devices (an endemic problem for small lot purchasers) . This
organizat ional posture inhibi ted or delayed the recognit ion of
the m a g n i t u d e of the system in tegra t ion task posed by
Shut t le-Centaur .
The Panel has followed the technical progress of this program
and whi le there are some current worries, they revolve more
around the results of unf in i shed testing for ce r t i f i ca t ion rather
than perceived^ real problems. Our concern real ly is: can the
volume of outs tanding work be done in time to meet the schedule?
The program is aware of this and appropriate emphasis and the
show stopper, if there is one, is the sheer m a g n i t u d e of the work
to be done and the lateness of component and system q u a l i f i c a t i o n
and v e r i f i c a t i o n . This problem has been evidenced in previous
reviews but should have subsided by now. It has not. Design
changes are still being made, for instance some 20 changes in the
ground launch system to s h i f t its philosophy from f a i l safe to
f a i l operational. This is a worthwhile goal and natura l launch
system evolution but should not burden the sys tem—if it
does--prior to Galileo and Ulysses deadlines.
The system should realize that the old philosophy that
technical perfect ion is more important than schedule has changed
wi th Galileo and Ulysses. Management must now schedule w i t h
s u f f i c i e n t marg in so that adequate technical peformance can be
obtained for f ixed schedules. It is the d i f f e r e n c e between a
development program and a transportation system. The case in
point is that more than a few systems are to be v e r i f i e d or
qua l i f i ed as a resul t of the wet countdown on the pad. This
simply does not allow any time for corrective measures should
problems develop. Program management should pr ior i t ize the
remaining work so that if necessary items essentially in the
"conf i rm for the record" class can be waived.
Tlu11 i1 are several technical problems t h a t <io not app<vu to lu>
crises but nevertheless are of. concern.
First, some Kevlar fibre used in manufacture oE helium
bottles on the CISS became streaked with oil as a result of a
leaking motor. There is some question as to whether or not
there is a degredation of fibre strength as a result. Helium
is necessary to drain the Centaur tanks in an abort and in
that case a helium tank becomes a single failure point.
There ate not enough new tanks to change out all the suspect
tanks arid hence the prudent thing would be to reduce tank
pressure somewhat until the matter is resolved. A study is
underway to see if margin is available to do this.
Second, the five inch fill and drain valve, also a single
failure point, albeit with a long and successful history, has
experienced some cracking of the metal lug or tang that
drives the valve. The analysis testing and explanations seem
to be reasonable and the recommended solution is straight-
forward and seems to entail no risk. The Panel agrees with
the actions taken on the basis of the material presented but
it is very late in the program for this type of action.
Third, the central control system uses five control units
in a voting system. These units use relay logic involving
magnetically latched, multi-pole relays. The complexity is
such that there are many—in the tens—-relays and the circuit
is particularly sensitive to a fault where a relay hangs up
in midposition. This can occur if contamination can get in
between the poles of the magnetic latching mechanism. A
second manufacturer has been located whose commercial relays
are of significantly better quality. The relays are
physically interchangeable and a sufficient supply is on
order to change out all such control unit relays over the
next couple of months, but again it is late and test time on
the new relay banks will be very limited.
7?
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}. Space Station
The Panel recognizes that the Space Station program is in the
formative period of development of both its organization and
staffing and its architecture and baseline operational concepts.
The current Phase B activities covering a 21 month period
initiates the contracted activities that will lead to the launch
and operation of the Space Station program elements which include
the station itself, space platforms, and orbital maneuvering
vehicles. Concurrent with the competition for the Space Station
definition and preliminary design which leads to a thorough
understanding of Station systems prior to hardware development,
NASA has begun a technology development program that is to enable
the? incorporation of the "proper" level of advanced,
sophisticated systems aboard the Station.
The Phase B period has two seguential parts, System
Definition and Preliminary Design. Space Station management has
noted that the following is needed prior to the initiation of
Prelminary Design:
a. System Definition which covers the manned core, platforms
and man-tended interfaces, allocation of functions/resources
to each element, and the international aspects.
b. System Reguirements which must be met by the design.
c. Plans, schedules and options/alternatives regarding
resource allocations, automation and robotics, logistics,
etc .
As a result of the Panel's early reviews of the Station, the
following comments are made:
a. The Space Station organizational structure is guite
complex with roles and missions and responsibilities
difficult to discern at times. There is and will be
occasional frustration in coping with the myriad of
management prejudices and opinions that exist. The program
is coping with and satisfying these multiple requirements.
The system seems to he working. A process is evolving for
crystallizing decisions that attempt to satisfy user
requirements as well as hudget concerns.
b. There is some question as to whether NASA is adequately
qualified to handle the complete integration of Phases C and
D — the hardware and software development. NASA is very good
at overseeing conceptual efforts. It has in-house depth of
knowledge not to be taken in or misled by others, but
integrating a large development effort such as STS and now
Space Station is something else. To our knowledge NASA has
never performed this role before.
c. Since the Space Station exists in. an essentially benign
environment compared to the Shuttle ascent and entry
environment it may be worth the effort to alleviate the
ascent environment requirements which drive much of the
design for the Space Station equipment and "user" hardware.
d. Since there are many similarities between the STS and
Space Station programs, looking into the "lessons learned"
relating to the early days of the Shuttle might better define
Space Station actions to preclude missteps. This
understanding of possible pitfalls for the Space Station
program might include insight as to what not to do, thereby
preventing inefficient use of resources (money, people,
schedule) .
Meeting the Space Station Program objectives within a
stringent budget requires early, quick, definitive action on the
part of progam management at all levels with emphasis on assuring
that system engineering and integration organizations have the
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responsibilities and authority as. reflected in the organizational
structure. This assumes a commonality of approach to every
critical aspect of the Station by the NASA Centers (e.g., safe
haven/rescue, design and operational simplicity, crew support for
IVA and EVA, safety threats). The following taken from NASA
Contractor Report ^854, June 1985, is instructive:
"It is interesting to trace the evolution of crew safety
philosophy through space programs, and to understand the
reasons for this evolution. Table 2-2 illustrates key
features of these philosophies or goals. The safety
philosophy which was baselined for the crew safety
alternative strategies study was consistent with these
trends, and is shown in Table 2-3, selected from a few
potential philosophies."
TABLE 2-2 EXPERIENCE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SAFETY PHILOSOPHY IN SPACE PROGRAMS
PROGRAM SAFETY PHILOSOPHY RATIONALE
APOLLO CREW SAFETY GOAL, .999
ABORT CAPABILITY IN ALL
MISSION PHASES
BACKUP MODES FOR CRITICAL
FUNCTIONS
MANY UNKNOWNS AT TIME
WORLD-WIDE EXPOSURE
OF PROGRAM
APOLLO-SOYUZ ABORT CAPABILITY IN ALL PROVEN HARDWARE
PHASES
BACKUP MODES FOR CRITICAL SINGLE MISSION
FUNCTIONS
SKYLAB LAUNCH CREW AFTER SKYLAB
SUCCESSFULLY ORBITED
CREW ESCAPE AVAILABLE BY
APOLLO CSM
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USE OF EXISTING
HARDWARE
SPACK SHUTTLK ABORT OAPAtUl.fTY USING THK
ORHITER
LIMITED CREW ESCAPE SYSTEM
DURING ORBITAL FLIGHT
TEST
SPACK I'HOC, RAM
MATURITY
EMPHASIS ON
ELIMINATING OR
CONTROLLING THREATS
RATHER THAN
ESCAPING FROM THEM
TABLE 2-3 SPACE STATION PHILOSOPHY PRECEDENCE
CURRENT OPTIONS COMMENTS
CAUSE NO DAMAGE WHATSOEVER TO SPACE
STATION AND NO INJURY TO CREW
DESIRABLE: COST TRADE
CAUSE NO DAMAGE TO SPACE STATION BEYOND
ROUTINE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY
COST TRADE
CAUSE NO DAMAGE TO SPACE STATION OR
INJURY TO CREW WHICH WILL RESULT IN A
SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS
BASELINE PHILOSOPHY
4. Life Sciences
This year's activities have shown that Extravehicular
Activities (EVA) will continue to be used extensively. The
•
Leasat rescue mission is an outstanding example of EVA.
Certainly the space station will require extensive EVA for its
construction and operational activities. The current suit
continues to function very well despite its limitations.
However, there is a perceived need for a more flexible suit in
the future that has the capability of operating at a higher
pressure than the current suit and its development should
beencouraged so that it can succeed the current suit on an
attrition basis.
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While it is much too early to be resolved, there has boon
considerable discussion relating to the makeup of the Space
Station life sciences module(s). Discussion has covered separate
modules for life sciences and materials research versus
separation into noisy and quiet modules. The Life Sciences
Advisory Committee (LSAC) currently favors the latter approach.
However, decisions in this area are yet to be made. Budgetary
constraints will also be a factor in the decision process.
The LSAC notes that there is a lack of knowledge relating to
the physical condition of astronauts after long duration flights.
They have no hesitation about approving in space duty tours of
three months or less. Anything beyond this is subject to
question. It is true that the Russians have had cosmonauts In
space for seven months, but these men required extensive periods
of hospital ization after return to earth. NASA's management must
continue to support the efforts of the life sciences group to
develop the necessary data to establish, with confidence, what
the maximum stay in space should be.
NASA is continuing its suit research activities at Ames with
the toroidal metal for arms and legs. Perhaps the way to go is
not to change suit pressure but to design these arms and legs as
replacment for the current ones. The current glove design which
is critical is good to 6+ psi .
5. Research Aircraft
Flight research is essential when technology development on
potentially important and promising new concepts cannot be
completed using analysis, simulation, and ground tests alone.
Factors such as geometric scale effects, handling qualities,
flight environment, dynamic behavior, pilot/flying qualities
interface, and the interactions among multiple discipline
technologies and system components, make flight testing an
absolute necessity in the investigation of some technology
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advances. Two cu r ren t NASA exper imenta l a i r c r a f t programs, the
fo rward swept wing X-29A and the X-Wing Rotary- to- f ixed b lade ,
involve such f l i g h t research.
a . X - 2 9 A Research A i r c r a f t
The overr iding object ive of the X-29 a i r c ra f t is to
va l ida te and document the b e n e f i t s of the Forward Swept Wing
concept and its in teract ive technologies by the most
a f f o r d a b l e means avai lable . The X-29 f l i g h t control system
is by far the most technical advanced fight control that has
ever been f lown managing mul t ip le control sur faces and a
large negative static s tabi l i ty marg in in subsonic f l i g h t .
There was a concern about landing wi th the analog
revers ion mode of control a f t e r f a i l u re of the d ig i t a l
system, since project pilot evaluations of the analog mode in
the CALSPAN airborne s imulat ion had shown a strong tendency
for a po ten t ia l ly dangerous pilot induced oscillation ( P I O )
in roll in the landing conf igura t ion . Subsequent f l i g h t
tests in the X-29A at safe a l t i tude using precision formation
f l y i n g tasks in the analog reversion mode and in the landing
c o n f i g u r a t i o n showed no problem. The CALSPAN simulat ion is
being revised to ref lect f l i g h t measured der iva t ives instead
of predicted values .
Ins ta l l a t ion of a new set of sensors for establishing
aerodynamic parameters is complete and allows for the
variat ion of gains of the analog reversion mode for safe
expansion of the X-29A envelope into the transonic and
supersonic f l i gh t regimes. The a i r c r a f t has f lown
transonic/sonic to a Mach number of about 1.03.
The basic divergence avoidance des ign of the wing
s t ruc ture has been proven by previous analysis and tests.
The m a x i m u m allowable "g" is cur ren t ly 6.4 g. The a i r c r a f t
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has been desig.ned for a m a x i m u m of 8 q; h o w e v e r , s ince the
w i t ig was not, sub jc-c tod to an u l t i m . i t o d < i s i i ] n load l o s t ( to
d e s t . r u c t ) , the 80% design l i m i a t i o n lias I H M M I a p p l i e d . Tlv.«
f l i g h t program of g radua l ly expand ing the a l lowable f r o m 6 .4
q to 8 g should be implemented. This wi l l be necessary if
the f u l l value of the integrated, advanced technologies are
to be tested. The high degree of test instrumentat ion and
the telemetry should allow this expansion to be done sa fe ly .
The a i r c r a f t is clean and decelerates slowly. Should
incipient f l u t t e r be encountered inadver ten t ly , for ins tance ,
rapid speed reduction would be essential for su rv iva l . More
gene ra l l y , i f the dual-pump engine-dr iven h y d r a u l i c system
should f a i l , considered an u n l i k e l y event unless the engine
should stop ro ta t ing ( f r e e z e ) , the emergency h y d r a z i n e system
w i l l d r ive the pumps for only seven m i n u t e s . At the end of
that time the controls wi l l " f reeze" and the a i r c r a f t w i l l
diverge long i tud ina l ly in a violent manner when in subsonic
f l igh t because of its 35% negative static marg in . Unless at
low speed ( low dynamic pressure) in such a case the a i r c r a f t
may encounter severe adverse s t ructural or crew impacts. To
avert such serious consequences speed brakes would enable
rapid slowdown to safe structural speeds for e ject ion or to
enable a safe landing on the desert floor if s u f f i c i e n t t ime
remains. Safe ty considerations suggest that engineer ing of
speed brakes be ini t ia ted for possible later r e t ro f i t to both
X-29A airframes, with installations to follow at a convenient
t ime in the respective programs. Cons ide r ing the number of
new technlogies involved and the fac t tha t the X-29 is a new
a i r c r a f t , the f l igh t s to date have been r e m a r k a b l y t r o u b l e
free .
b . X-Wing Rotor Systems Research A i r c r a f t ( R S R A )
The X-Wing f l ight invest igat ion project objec t ives are to
develop and demonstrate, in f l i gh t , X-Wing rotor des ign ,
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cont ro ls , and pneumodynamies technologies . T h i s is to be
accomplished by concen t r a t i ng on the convers ion f r o m rotor to
f ixed blade ac t iv i t ies , by inves t iga t ing d y n a m i c s ,
performance, and control w i t h i n a l imited envelope, and
thereaf te r to establish a safe envelope and f l i gh t procedures
for X-Wing research. The approach being followed is
basical ly to:
(1) Design, bui ld and ground test an X-Wing rotor and control
system, . including supporting research and technology.
(2) Instal l the X-Wing and Fl ight Control System in a
m o d i f i e d Rotor Systems Research A i r c r a f t ( R S R A ) and conduct a
40-hour f l i gh t test program.
The X-Wing program has been laboring under an over ly op t imis t i c
schedule. The Program is work ing on the leading edge of new and
complex technologies, such as:
(1) Circulation-control rotor, encompassing pneumodynamics
and its intr icate system for meter ing the reguired ai r f lows
at a h igh seguential rate, as commanded by digi tal software.
(2) S ta r t ing and stopping a l i f t i n g rotor in forward f l i g h t ,
even tua l ly wi thou t b e n e f i t of a f ixed winq ( look ing beyond
the R S R A ) .
(3) Essentially total dependency on very sophisticated
digi tal electronic systems con t ro l l ing b lade - t r a i l ing-edge
a i r f low for l i f t and control , as well as for h ighe r ha rmon ic
v ibra t ion suppression, superimposed.
(4) Development of slender, composite rotor blades (swept
wings when stopped) which are to resist s t ruc tura l f l u t t e r
and divergence while ca r ry ing , in te rna l ly , air at
temperatures of 250-350 degrees Fahrenhei t .
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The Program schedules have slipped; the first flight in the
stopped-rotor configuration is now being scheduled for the first
of 1987. Tests with the propulsion systems test bed (PSTB) and
the powered "flying" wind-tunnel model are iust getting under
way, the latter a key to safo and successful flight of the
X-Wing.
The Sikorsky safety program, supported by experienced
engineering from the Sikorsky Executive Safety Committee, now
seems to have appropriate emphasis and manpower allocated for
avoiding or alleviating problems. Slippage of schedules has and
will occur because of the sizeable tasks involved and an
optimistic and unrealistic original schedule. However, it is
mandatory in this program to proceed carefully and thoroughly,
regardless of schedules.
The overall safety program for the X-wing/RSRA has many
aspects and organizations. These include the Ames and Dryden
safety reviews, the Sikorsky Flight Safety Board, and
subcontracted analyses by Boeing (BSI in Houston, Texas) for a
Hazard Analysis of the entire vehicle and the Northrop
Corporation for fixed wing aeroelastic support. The results of
the powered model wind tunnel test, the Propulsion System Test
Bed (PSTB) dynamic test and the extensive flight control
simulation efforts will form the real foundation for verification
of the flight safety of the vehicle design.
The principal airframe restrictions of high speed performance
for a forward swept winged aircraft is aeroelastic divergence.
On the other hand, aeroelastic flutter is usually the limiter for
aft swept winged, high performance aircraft. The X-Wing aircraft
is unigue in that it has both a forward and an aft swept wing
when operating in the fixed wing flight mode and therefore could
be limited by either flutter or aeroelastic divergence. The
traditional procedure for ensuring the absence of these
catastropic aeroelastic phenomena is to first design the
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structure to withstand the flight loads (a strength design) and
subsequently to re-analyze the strength design to detemine the
point (dynamic pressure and velocity) where flutter or divergence
would occur. If this point is outside of the flight envelope, no
further design modification is needed. Otherwise, modifications
must be made to add additional stiffness to the strength design.
Like other theoretical analysis, there are many assumptions and
simplifications inherent to the method used for determining the
flutter or divergence point; consequently, if the calculated
point is near any point of the flight envelope, it is prudent to
build an aeroelastic model of the entire aircraft or possibly of
the airfoil surface in question (wing or tail). Due primarily to
tail rotor restrictions, the maximum dive speed of the RSRA
X-Wing has been set at 300 kts. With the standard aeroelastic
safety factor this establishes 345 kts at sea level (the region
of maximum dynamic pressure) as the aeroelastic design velocity.
Albeit, the aircraft design must not possess either a flutter and
a divergence point below this velocity. Indeed, the absence of
all instabilities at velocities below 345 kts (a dynamic pressure
of 300 Ib/ft2) must be established by a combination of wind
tunnel and analytic programs.
The RSRA/X-Wing represents the first time that an aircraft
has been designed to operate at speeds above the airframe
aeroelastic instability point. This requires the active control
of the aeroelasticly unstable modes by the flight control system
(in addition to the unstable rigid body modes); and therefore,
makes it the most complex PCS design ever attempted.
6. NASA Aircraft Operations
The Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel continues its
preparation of guideline documents to serve as basis for
management instructions to be issued by Headquarters. This is
currently the only practical way in which central direction is
provided covering all aircraft operations. This process is
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extremely slow because of the need to obtain approval of all
flight operations chiefs, to coordinate these through a central
office in Headquarters and to obtain final approval through the
NASA heirarchy. Further, the failure, for another year, to
appoint a head of the Aircraft Management Office in Headquarters
further slows the approval process. There is a great need for a
fully qualified operations manager for this program.
Ideally, there would be a single flight operations entity,
reporting directly to the Administrator or Deputy Administrator.
This entity would have direct and overall responsibility for all
flight operations functions, whether administrative or research
and development. Flight operations divisions would be located as
they are today and would provide service to the various centers,
but would not report to the center. Budgets would be centralized
and apportioned in accordance with the needs for routine
operations and maintenance. All center projects would then
become contracts between flight operations and the specific
center.
E. NASA'S RESPONSE 'I'D PANEL'S CY 1984 ANNUAL REPORT
Taking each of the items covered in both the Annual Report and
the NASA response to it, the following items are "Closed" or
"Open" as noted. Ot" 20 items, 14 are "closed" and 6 are "open."
Those that are "open" are still in work with implementation yet
to come. The numbering sequence follows that in the NASA
response .
1.0 Launch Processing and Logistics
1.1 CLOSED - Panel will continue overview of KSC (NASA and
contractor) manpower ability to meet increasing flight rate
while maintaining an acceptable level of safety including
effects of "operational efficiencies" through 1988-89 to
reach 24 flights per year.
1.2 CLOSED - Continue overview of Orbiter Hardware/Software
upgrades (other STS elements as applicable) to assure such
modifications/changes do not adversely affect reliability,
maintainability and/or safety (and sparing reguirements).
1.3 CLOSED - Proposed letter from Jesse Moore to Center
Directors and NSTS management indicates, "We must take
further action to assure the reguired increase in the Shuttle
flight rate which necessitates a steady reduction in
turnaround activities. . . . The change and modification
work in the OPF (Orbiter) has been highlighted as the key
driver . . ." Panel continue oversight of this concern.
1.4 CLOSED - Operations organization and management
discussions.
1.5 a. CLOSED - Use of the term "operational" as applied to
the Space Transportation System was addressed in great
detail. ... It is not considered an "airline" by NASA.
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b. OPEN - T rans i t i on of tasks ( p a r t i c u l a r l y su s t a in ing
«?nti ineer i n q ) f r o m JSC to KSC. Tt was noted that a plan was
in process and that Panel should f o l l o w the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
this t r ans i t ion d u r i n g 1986-87.
c. OPEN - The following additional points:
(1) Space Transportation System Operations Contract
(STSOC) at JSC goes into e f fec t January 1, 1986. Panel is
requested to follow this as they did the SPC at KSC.
(2) Rev iew the launch cons t ra in ts being modi f i ed in
order to increase launch probabi l i ty and t u r n a r o u n d mods as
wel l .
(3) Comprehensive m a i n t e n a n c e plan supposed to have been
released September 1985.
(4) In i t i a l lay-in of spares to be completed by October
1987. Status, impact of reduced fund ing . . . par t icu lar ly
if it a f f e c t s safety .
2.0 SSME precursor test program to be completed dur ing CY 1985.
( O P E N )
Compet i t ive engine ( t u r b o p u m p s ) program RFP on the street.
( C L O S E D ) Panel wi l l fol low this in 1986.
Phase II and 11+ on going. ( C L O S E D )
3.0 Fi lament Wound Case fol low-up inc lud ing : Veh i c l e e x c u r s i o n s ,
l i f t -o f f loads a l l ev i a t i on , l i f t - o f f d r i f t concerns, f l i g h t
control s tabi l i ty impacts due to elastic propert ies , FRF
impact on s t ructura l adequacy of "single-use" f i r s t f l i g h t
segments ( O P E N )
4.1 Results of Rockwel l ' s detailed f rac ture / fa t igue analyses for
test a r t ic le LI-36 (wing /mid- fuse lage /a f t - fuse lage s t ructure
being conducted June 85 to January 86. ( O P E N )
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4 .2 I n d i v i d u a l Or b i t e r D e l t a ' s and p e r f o r m a n c e
c a p a b i l i t y - s t r u c t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s and load i n d i c a t o r
redlines. Follow in 1986 ( C L O S E D )
4.3 Orbiter Brake Upgrade - Many activities started, some tested,
some on-going activities Structural carbon use fa i l op/fail
safe Nose Wheel Steering system vs. current f a i l safe , etc.
Panel fol low these in 1986. ( C L O S E D )
5.0 Development of higher pressure EVA sui te . ( C L O S E D )
Note the fol lowing from Beggs1 response: "The cur ren t Agency
posture for f u r t h e r space su i t developments wi l l be addressed
in the Space Stat ion Phase B regui rements d e f i n i t i o n . These
requ i rements wi l l be eva lua ted , and a de t e rmina t i on wi l l be
made as to the acceptabil i ty of the cur ren t Shut t le system,
of an enhanced system or the need for a new high pressure
system."
6.0 Orbi ter OV-102 in an R&D role with appropriate
ins t rumenta t ion . (CLOSED)
7
.0 KSC/VAFB common operations. (CLOSED)
8.0 Shu t t l e /Cen tau r to adequately conduct tests w i t h i n c u r r e n t
schedule and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of r e su l t an t analyses is a
concern. ( O P E N )
9 .0 RTG Safe ty (F i r s t Centaur mi s s ions ) . M a i n t a i n awareness.
(CLOSED)
10.0 N A S A ' s R&D and A d m i n i s t r a t i v e a i r c r a f t operations
management and policy implementation. Panel continues to
moni tor . ( C L O S E D )
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NASA
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Washington. D.C
20546
Offce of the Administrator September 25, 1985
Mr. John C. Brizendine
Chairman
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
6306 Bixby Hill Road
Long Beach, CA 90815
Dear John:
Enclosed for your consideration is the NASA response to the findings
and recommendations provided by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
in its Annual Report for 1984.
This year I have also commented on the additional discussions
contained in the "Fact Finding" section. Where our positions have
been modi-fied from those stated in the past report, I have noted those
changes. Comments which specifically address the report's 10 recommendations
are submitted in the respective appendices.
The panel's guidance and support is always appreciated. Your
inputs have been and continue to be important management tools in the
guidance of NASA.
Sincerely,
Original signed by
James M. Beggs
James M. Beggs
Administrator
Enclosure
APPENDICES 1 TO 10, NASA RESPONSE TO THE 1984 ANNUAL ASAP REPORT
APPENDIX 1: LAUNCH PROCESSING AND LOGISTICS
ASAP Recommendation 1.1
NASA management should continue to allocate the human and
financial resources required to maintain acceptable levels of
safety in what in many respects is still a developmental program
from the point of view of the ultimate use of space as well as
the maturity of the system.
NASA Response; We believe the level of manpower being
applied by the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) at both
KSC and VAFB is commensurate with the high safety standards
and requirements of a manned space flight program and NASA's
overall program goal of evolving the Space Shuttle into a
cost effective operation. The maturing, developmental nature
of the program is recognized and the essential need for
constant safety and quality assurance vigilance is a
continuing concern. NASA is committed to continuation of the
required resources to maintain an acceptable level of safety.
The number of KSC Shuttle operational personnel remains
fairly stable. The number decreased when the SPC came on
board early in FY 84 and has remained almost constant for the
last year (decreased approximately 1%). We expect it to
increase some in the next 1^ years because of additional work
stations coming on-line (i.e., Pad B, MLP-3, Logistic
Warehouse), and then decrease with operational efficiencies
through 1988-89.
The KSC safety policy has not changed since the SPC concept
has been implemented. However, the contractor now has
responsibility for the implementation of that safety policy
with NASA civil servants practicing an oversight and
surveillance role. The number of safety personnel actually
increased from approximately 35 to 45 under the SPC. This
increase was considered necessary as a result of the
increased launch processing activity and higher launch rate.
ASAP Recommendation 1.2
Modifications to the Orbiter — such as main engine, structure,
avionics, and brakes — should be directed at improving
reliability, maintainability, and safety as well as achieving
additional increments in performance.
NASA Response: I concur wholeheartedly with this
recommendation. A large percentage of Orbiter changes are
/y .1 made for these reasons. Examples of modifications which will
IT improve reliability, maintainability and/or safety are the
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improved APU, IMU, fuel cell, brakes and nose wheel
steering. The EEE parts program is also directed at
improving reliability for the GPC and IMU. Engine
Improvements are discussed in Appendix 2.
ASAP Recommendation 1.3
KASA management should make a concerted effort to identify and
prepare for Orbiter modifications prior to commencement of the
launch processing sequence. "Freeze point" discipline must be
maintained. Unexpected changes and modifications must be held to
a mininrjTT. if the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) is to
achieve the projected flight rate.
NASA Response; Over the past year, the Level 2 and 3 program
offices have made concerted efforts to identify and permit
preparations at KSC for Orbiter modifications prior to
commencement of the launch processing sequence. The Panel is
invited to JSC to receive full details on the operation of
the system, referred to as the Rockwell BARS (Baseline
Accounting and Reporting System). That system provides KSC
with computer access to all mods. Mods are identified on a
per flight basis as well as a total listing. Changes are
prioritized as either mandatory prior to a particular flight
or as those which are to be installed at the first available
opportunity. A program directive (PRCBD S31730) has been
issued which is the implementing document. Copies of the
presentation material and the directive are available for
review.
ASAP Recor-.r.endation 1.4
Vesting overall Shuttle management in an "operations entity" at
NASA Headquarters would help achieve acceptable levels of
efficiency, productivity, and schedule reliability during this
period of "developmental evolution." - The Panel has made this
recommendation in past years and NASA management is presently
examining this and related issues through the Shuttle Operations
Strategic Planning Group, the Smylie Committee.
NASA Response: I feel that the Agency is making strides in
the direction of an operations entity which the Panel
suggests is the proper course to pursue. Since I reported to
you last year, the SPC (Shuttle Processing Contractor) is
onboard and has successfully launched all vehicles since
STS 41C. The contract for operations at JSC is expected to
be awarded in January 19B6.
With regard to changes at Headquarters, there are several
developments that you should be aware of. Within the last
year NASA established two groups to study the Space Shuttle's
organizational setting and role within NASA. The groups are
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the Shuttle Operations Strategic Planning Group, chaired by
Mr. Ed Smylie and the Shuttle Operations Fencing Team chaired
by Mr. Charles Gunn. Copies of the reports from these two
groups have been transmitted to the Panel.
The Strategic Planning Group concluded that, for the
foreseeable future, the Space Shuttle should continue to be
managed and operated by NASA, and outlined several
organizational alternatives we are now considering. The
Shuttle Operations Fencing Team concluded that the Shuttle
operating budgets, organizations, and facilities are now
effectively segregated, or "fenced," at each of the operating
centers and the consolidation of Shuttle operations contracts
(e.g., BOC (Base Operations Contractor), SPC (Shuttle
Processing Contractor), STSOC (Space Transportation System
Operations Contractor) and FEPC (Flight Equipment Processing
Contractor)), plus the evolution from fixed fee to cost
incentive contracts, further promotes fencing of the Shuttle
from other NASA programs. The Fencing Team, in consonance
with the ASAP recommendation, also recognized a need to
change the balance between development and operations within
NASA Headquarters to place more employees in operations. The
Office of Space Flight has reorganized to better focus on
requirements, issues, and procedures, which are dominant in
operations,' as opposed to acquisition and development.
ASAP Recorr.T.endation 1.5
NASA management would be well advised to avoid advertising the
Shuttle as being "operational" in the airline sense when it
clearly isn't. More to the point, however, is the fact that
Shuttle operations for the next 5 to 10 years are not likely to
achieve the "routine" character associated with commercial
airline operations. Given this reality, the continuing use of
the term "operational" simply compounds the unique management
challenge of guiding the STS through this period of
"developmental evolution." NASA should continue to focus on
making the STS as efficient, productive and reliable as possible,
while the research and development flights are defining the
commercial use of space.
NASA Response: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
42 states that NASA's first priority is to make the STS fully
operational and cost-effective in providing routine access to
space. 'NSDD 144 directed that NASA and DOD jointly define
"fully operational and cost-effective" and the specific steps
leading to that status. Our definition is provided below,
and you will note that nowhere is a reference or an analogy
made to airline characteristics. As illustrated elsewhere in
this report, I believe we have set in place policies,
procedures, practices and processes to make the STS as
efficient, productive and reliable as possible, while
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balancing the necessity to be cost-effective in the world's
marketplace.
fxcerpt from NSDD 144
DEFINITION OF A FULLY OPERATIONAL AND COST-EFFECTIVE
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Introduction
NASA's highest priority is to make the Nation's Space
Transportation System (STS) fully operational and cost-
effective in providing routine access to space. Fully
operational means that the STS is ready and available for
routine use in the intended operational environment to
achieve the committed operational objectives. This means
that critical performance capabilities have been verified
by flight demonstration; that adequate logistic support
for the systems is in place; that the ground and flight
processing capabilities are adequate to support the
committed flight schedule of up to 24 flights per year
with margins for routine contingencies attendant with a
flight surge capability; and that the appropriate
operational management capabilities are in place. Cost-
effect ive means that the Shuttle provides space services
for specific levels of mission capabilities with an
effectiveness at least equivalent to the cost of
alternative systems. The definition must recognize the
unique capabilities of the Shuttle that cannot now be
attained by alternative systems. Cost-effectiveness is a
function of the unique capabilities required by each
category of mission (e.g., launch and deploy, retrieval,
on-orbit repair, refuel, assembly, life sciences R&D, and
man tended services and applications). As the Shuttle
becomes fully operational, its cost-effectiveness in all
categories across its full sp.ectrum of space missions can
be improved by continued reduction in operating costs.
Joint NASA/DOD STS program capabilities, requirements, and
plans for development, activation and operation of the Space
"Shuttle through the mid-1990's are defined in the NASA/DOD
Space Transportation System Master Plan, Part I; Baseline
Operations Plan, chartered by the NASA/DOD Aeronautics and
Astronautics Coordinating Board. This plan was published in
mid 1985 and states:
I. Fully Operational STS
The STS is fully operational when specified levels of
capability and maturity have been achieved in (A)
Systems Capabilities and (B) Management.
The Agency continues its evolutionary process of becoming
"operational." Great strides were taken this spring when JSC
and KSC reached an agreement on definition of center roles
and responsibilities for the STS operations era. As stated
in the JSC memorandum, dated May 7, 1985,
"KSC will assume responsibility for the integrity of
and sustaining engineering for all certified Orbiter
flight hardware, flight readiness certification-and
Orbiter configuration control. KSC will also be
responsible for flight hardware spares and logistics
activity. The sustaining engineering responsibility
includes the LSSC, which may be an early transition
step.
JSC will retain responsibility for development and
certification of new or upgraded Orbiter flight
hardware. JSC will also retain responsibility for
long lead planning for the fleet/manifest, mission
analysis, flight software, avionics as a system and
the analytical disciplines such as loads, thermal,
aero and the like. JSC will continue to provide on-
call engineering support as required."
A plan to implement that policy is being developed by KSC.
Discussion of Fact Finding Points for Recommendation 1
The following paragraphs address points raised by the Panel in
.the "Fact Finding" section of your report.
With regard to the ASAP comment that "there must be no disruption
in the operational support adequacy and ability to safely launch
and turnaround the Space Transportation System as currently
operating," NASA continues to assess methods of reducing
turnaround times and optimizing operations. Where a decision is
made to reduce or optimize, careful analysis is given to ensure
that operational adequacy is maintained and that the safety of
the Shuttle during turnaround and launch and landing operations
is always maintained.
We concur with the Panel's statement that "Personnel are a key
resource and provisions must be made to "feed in" new people to
replace, as necessary, those leaving." This has been one of the
major goals vhich 1 established for NASA.
During FY 84, of the 384 scientist and engineer (SfcE) new hires,
in NASA, 246 (64%) were at the GS-9 grade or below. This
represents a continuation of the "fresh-out" initiatives begun in
FY 82. For FY 82-84, 1449 S&E's were hired and 1049 (72%) were
at the GS-9 grade or below.
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The Panel notes that "traditional organization arrangements,
review methodology, handling of payloads, and system
certifications cannot remain static but will change with STS
maturity and accompanying knowledge and objectives" and that
•complacency at any point in the process must be guarded
against." KA5A is presently seeking an STS Operations Contract
contractoi to consolidate the Shuttle operations tasks at JSC.
The purpose is to improve cost-effectiveness via consolidations
of mission operations during the STS operations era while
maintaining a high level of technical performance. The
contractor will be given considerable latitude in forming and
developing an approach based on his unique capabilities and
experiences. The STS basic program objective of reliable and
economical space transportation is paramount; conformance with
the historical "business as usual" approach, typical of
development and test programs, is not. We expect this new
contractor to begin operation in January 1966.
From an STS cargo processing standpoint, there are a number of
enhancements underway or planned that will reduce the handling
times of STS payloads. Our customers are encouraged to qualify
payloads for flight ready storage in order to minimize their pre-
launch time at the launch site. They are also urged to provide
an adequate number of personnel to facilitate multiple-shift work
as required, so as to minimize stay time.
On a payload-by-payload basis, technical assessments are
conducted to determine whether stand alone, simulated mission
sequence, or end-to-end testing can be eliminated. A continuing
effort is underway at JSC to identify ways to simplify the
payload-to-Orbiter interfaces. As interfaces are simplified,
payload installation and subsequent check-out procedures will be
streamlined, resulting in time savings. Although efforts are
being made to minimize or delete unnecessary payload operations,
care will continue to be taken to insure that necessary
procedures are not neglected.
The ASAP observes (page 39) that "a specific aspect of the
management process which bears further attention are the 'Program
Freeze Points' and their use. Program freeze points are
established at specific intervals during flight processing.
Freeze points are defined as those points in time when the
design, definition, and content of the cargo, integration
hardware/software and flight design, vehicle flight
hardware/software, crew activities/stowage and launch site flow
are complete. Subsequent to these points, only mandatory changes
to the hardware, software or affected documentation are permitted
(mandatory changes are those necessary to ensure crew/vehicle
safety and/or accomplishment of primary mission objectives).
Such freeze points are established for each mission."
The management of "Freeze Points" is receiving significant
attention within NASA and the Shuttle customer community.
•Changes to the design/definition/content decisions made at the
"Freeze Points" are being resisted so that the mission design and
planning can proceed in an orderly fashion. The schedule of the
Freeze Points IB a compromise between the desires of the
customers (who would like the "Freeze Points" scheduled as late
as possible to allow flexibility in cargo design) and the mission
planners (who would like the "Freeze Points" scheduled as early
as possible to allow tine for mission design). NASA is
developing techniques and tools to increase the productivity in
the planning efforts and, thus, better support the customers.
"Preparations for contingency landing site (CLS) activities must
be planned to meet mission goals and to minimize expenditure of
resources which can best be used elsewhere. (Refer to page 37)
CLS activities have been planned with a minimum investment of
resources but still provide the ability to support Orbiter
operations with safe back-up options. It is agreed these
resources could be used elsewhere, but where considered
essential, the CLS capability has been provided. Particular CLS
attention is being given to the missions involving the launch of
radioisotope thermal-electric generators.
"Operational efficiency, as measured by such things as turnaround
time reduction, hardware increased reliability (increased mean
time between failures), increased crew effectiveness and weather
predicting, are all part of operations. Since day of launch
winds can affect vehicle aerodynamic loads, better trajectory
shaping and load reduction can be accomplished with winds as near
to T-0 as possible. The actual "doing" part of launch and
landing, along with retrieval of SRB's, has been proven through
the STS missions to date. However, one area of continuing'
interest is the impact of flight vehicle and ground equipment
hardware and software changes (both generic and mission unique)
and procedural changes upon the ground sites, including
modifications to the launch constraints or so-called "red and
blue lines."
Operational efficiency has been improving, as indicated by the
turnaround time improvement from 187 'days for STS-2, to a current
average in the neighborhood of 55 days; our best turnaround time
to date was 50 days for STS 51-B. Efforts are continuing to
achieve additional efficiencies in several functional areas. The
weather predicting capability is now being improved through the
addition of communications, radar, and other equipment. Also,
plans are being formulated for more refined, long-range weather
predicting improvement through advanced technology surveys,
studies, and applications. Changes are being minimized. Winds
are measured by Jimsphere down to L-3.5 hours.
The Panel iterates on page 40 that "a complementary area of
interest is the pre- and post-flight mission reviews. The Panel
notes, as it has in the past (see Annual Report dated January
1982 and January 1983), that the management review processes
remain little changed from those used on early missions. With an
increased flight rate, maturing systems and hands-on resources,
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there remains the involvement of a large number of high level
management personnel. Changes made to date in this review system
have certainly helped but further streamlining should be expected
in the fu tu re . " It should be noted that the reviews conducted
and the reports generated in support of the Shutt le missions are
undergoing continual evaluation »s to their content and
requirement. This e f for t , even in a "business as usual" context,
is decreasing as the program matures and there are fewer problems
to be reported and coordinated. E f f o r t s have been reduced
through abbreviated pre- and post-mission reports, Headquar te rs
mission monitoring and reporting, and follow-up briefings. I am
encouraging the Headquar ters s taff to reduce the amount of
requ i red paperwork, as well as their direct involvement, in these
act ivi t ies . However, it must be anticipated that where un ique
missions are flown, interest and involvement on the part of high
level management will continue.
"The Panel (ASAP) has previously recommended that a comprehensive
maintenance plan be established partly as a system to prevent
interruptions in the launch ra te through the 1990 period and
beyond, and partly to provide a more rational basis for the
cur ren t logistics plan which is now underway. While some
elements of maintenance planning are evident , there does not yet
appear to be a total plan which would include contingencies such
as mult iple SSME f a i l u r e s or planned wi thdrawal of an Orbi ter for
s t ruc tura l f a t i g u e examinat ion or replacement. This sort of
maintenance ove rv iew may indeed .-exist and will be examined by the
Panel in the f u t u r e . " (Page 4.0) 7 - n
The Panel 's observations are proper and a comprehensive
maintenance plan is being developed by the Johnson Space Center
Logistics O f f i c e (LG) . The es t imated release date is September
1985. We welcome your review and comments.
"The SPC in its operations has uncovered some problems; the most
serious of which is shortage of spares. Line replaceable uni ts
(un i t s des igned for rapid replacement) are in short supply and
the only a l t e r n a t i v e is to cannibalise — that is to remove a
work ing component f rom another Orbi ter and pay back the loan when
the part becomes avai lable . This is a costly procedure in te rms
of manhours and delay, but the sa fe ty implications are those of
v io la t ing a c e r t i f i e d system to get the necessary parts. Another
s ign i f i can t problem is that of the workload caused by the
incorporation of modi f ica t ions on the Orbi ter at KSC. Even
though mod i f i ca t ions are s c r u t i n i z e d before the decision is made
to incorporate them, f u r t h e r controls may have to be i n s t i t u t ed ,
if the launch rate requi rements are to be met . The next year or
so should see some improvement in logistics and support problems
as the SPC program advances sa t i s fac tor i ly ."
Although some spares shortages do exist , the r equ i s i t ion f i l l
ra tes of both f l igh t h a r d w a r e ( F H ) and ground support equipment
(CSE) are continually improving . The KSC requis i t ion f i l l rates
• fo r November 1984 through F e b r u a r y 1985 are:
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NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY FEBRUARY
FH 88.7 90.9 91.8 90.5
GSE 82.2 84.1 83.0 85.5
Our initial lay-in of spares will be completed in October 1986.
"If OV-105 is ever funded , it will have the beneficial effect of
providing a standby vehicle in the Orbi ter f leet , but at the same
time will sop up most of the available production spares thus
exace rba t ing the problems sur rounding each individual launch
toward the 1990's. The goal is presently some 20 f l igh t s per
year f r o m R5C and 4 per year f rom VAFB. There has been a sizable
t r ans fe r of experienced personnel from KSC to VAFB and we were
told that there are about 1200 LSOC people there now." The long
lead time between fund ing and delivery of OV-105 — if and when
it is f u n d e d — will allow adequate lead time for lay-in of
suppor t ing spares. A f u r t h e r logistics benef i t to the f u n d i n g of
OV-105 would be that "product ion line spares" would be avai lable
to support the en t i r e Shut t le program for a longer period of t ime
than is present ly envis ioned. This wil l undoubted ly f u r t h e r
improve our spares long-term support posture.
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APPENDIX 2. SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES (SSME'S)
ASAP Recommendation
The modified improvement program should be pursued vigorously.
All reasonable effort should be exerted to develop the new hot
gas manifold and to incorporate it at the earliest date
feasible. Activity to reduce start and shutdown temperature
transients should be added to the "Phase II+" program. Mission
planning should continue to consider 104% RPL thrust as the
normal operating level for the engines. We will use the 109% RPL
thrust capability only for those missions dependent on the higher
thrust and as an abort capability.
NASA Response; The precursor test program scheduled to be
completed during CY 85 will include a limited test series (7
to 11 tests) with the large throat main combustion chamber
designed to reduce turbine temperatures, modification to
control valves to ameliorate start transient turbine
temperature spikes and a single tube heat exchanger. The
test series will include "bomb" tests of the chamber to
determine stability margin and to assess the need for baffles
or acoustic cavities. Elimination of these stability aids
could provide performance improvement in terms of increased
specific impulse.
The competitive engine program is structured to provide an
alternative approach to engine design improvements/
modifications which improve reliability and safety by
increasing operating margin and extending hardware life.
The baseline program consisting of the Phase II and Phase in-
activities is underway with the Phase II certification
testing having been initiated in March 1985 and scheduled to
be complete in October 1985. The Phase 11+ development
testing with the new, 2 duct, hot gas manifold is scheduled
to start in May 1986. I should note that this program does
not include LOx pump redesign which was indicated in last
year's response to the Panel.
The baseline program is now just getting into certification
testing, and it is premature to speculate how well these
improvements will improve reliability maintainability,
safety, and performance. Improved life and operating margin
is being realized in the development program testing to
date. Until these improvements are made, we plan to limit
the current engine to 104%.
10
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APPENDIX 3. SPACE SHUTTLE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRM/SRB)
ASAP Recommendation
An analysis and tests be performed on the filament wound case
with the total stack to establish lift-off loads and vehicle
excursions considering the lower modal frequencies.
NASA Response; The analysis conducted predicted a flexible
filament wound case. The initial quarter scale testing at
MSFC showed that the SRB joint free play was a potential
source of increased vehicle on-pad excursions. Tests to the
full 125% flight load limit will be performed on a flight
segment by January 1986.
As test data from FWC hydroproof testing and sag data
recorded during the DM-6 static firing became available, it
was found that the entire SRB FWC joint area was much less
stiff -than expected. The DM-7 Static Test confirmed the DM-6
test results. New SRB FWC dynamic math models were
constructed by MSFC, and a special analysis effort of the
stacked vehicle was initiated to assess the effect of the
recorded stiffness in five areas already thought to be
marginal. This assessment was completed in late December
1984 with results as follows in the five problem areas:
1. Vehicle on Pad Excursions (FWC, VAFB): Predicted
excursions exceed both the 1CD and the range of previous
tests. The impact of these results is being assessed by
KSC. A new series of tests, exceeding the predicted
values by 10%, is being planned for the Launch Equipment
Test Facility and will include a new "haunch" assembly
simulating the VAFB umbilicals. Results will be verified
by the "twang" test at VAFB and supported by Structural
Test Article testing at MSFC
2. Lift-off Loads; Significant load increases were
predicted at the SRB/ET forward attachment and in crew
cabin accelerations. The increased attachment loads have
been assessed to be within the structural capability of
the vehicle, and the effect on payloads of the increased
accelerations has been determined to be acceptable.
3. .Lift-off Drift; The clearance between the SRB and
the facility during lift-off are essentially unchanged,
and the minimum four inch exclusion envelope is not
violated.
4. SRB Hold Down Bolt Load; An increase of
approximately three percent in maximum bolt tensile load
which occurs at the maximum excursion during SSME build-
up, is predicted. MSFC has assessed this increase to be
11
acceptable due to other acti'ons taken to alleviate the
bolt load problem.
5. Flight Control Stability Marg in : The predicted
reduction in the SRB bending mode frequency was
determined to be unacceptable. The f l ight control
systems software has been redesigned to insure acceptable
m a r g i n s . These changes will be incorporated for YLS-1.
Because of the lack of actual test data on the .FWC conf igura t ion ,
the development of the math model representations used in these
studies has been very d i f f i c u l t and uncer ta in . The DM-6 and DM-7
sag tests were the f i r s t chances to assess actual bending
s t i f f n e s s , and resul ted in the most s igni f icant change. Special
measurements du r ing the DM-7 test did confirm the bending model
parameters. Since the interim assessment discussed above,
several minor changes that do not a f fec t the above problems have
been incorporated in the math models, and the next major analysis
cycle is u n d e r w a y . This is the f ina l planned set of studies of
the Shu t t l e /FWC combination and is considered to be the pr imary
v e r i f i c a t i o n analysis.
Due to the lack of m a t u r i t y of our unders tand ing of the FWC
proper t i es , a d d i t i o n a l test ing to demonstrate the va l id i ty of the
v e r i f i c a t i o n analys is is considered necessary. A test is planned
at VAFB us ing a f u l l y s tacked SRB. The current ly baselined twang
test wil l be expanded to include sine-dwell , and random survey
tes t ing . A special pull test, us ing the two SRM's on VLS-1, was
also recently basel ined to evaluate joint f r e e play and bolt load
e f fec t s .
Complet ion of the p lanned analysis activit ies and the testing
i d e n t i f i e d above will i n s u r e that adequate m a r g i n s exist in these
i d e n t i f i e d . A f l i g h t readiness f i r i n g would demonstra te adequa te
m a r g i n s r e g a r d i n g bolt loads and excurs ions dr iven by SSME build-
up, byt these i tems mus t be demonstra ted prior to a t tempting
ei ther an FRF or launch.
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APPENDIX 4. ORBITER STRUCTURAL" LIFE CERTIFICATION AKD
STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY
ASAP Recommendation (1)
The Panel agrees with the decision to certify these two articles
(LI (Line Item) 31 and LI 36) by analysis. A detailed analysis
plan for the two test articles should be developed and
implemented to fulfill the certification program for 100
missions.
NASA Response-. A plan to analyze the two test articles does
exist. The Orbiter vehicle end item specification requires
certification of the Orbiter primary structure for 100
missions times a scatter factor of four. Detailed
fracture/fatigue analysis has been completed for LI 31, the
wing/elevon structure, and the analysis confirms the
capability of the structure to be certified in accordance
with the specification. Detailed fracture/fatigue analysis
for "LI 36," the wing/mid-fuselage/aft-fuselage structure,
started in June 1985. Completion is estimated by January,
1986.
ASAP Recorr.n-endation (2)
Conduct a systematic review and document the structural
differences, safety margins and major logistics impacts for each
Orbiter vehicle. In recognition of these differences, baseline
the performance envelope for each Orbiter and, as required,
determine the trade-offs between any structural/aerodynamic
modifications and performance.
NASA Response; Trade-off studies between structural and
aerodynamic modifications and performance have been conducted
for OV-103 and 104. The most productive option in terms of
performance gain versus mod complexity has been
implemented. This option, which strengthens the X0=1365 wing
spar and upper rib caps, results in a net payload gain of
approximately 4,000 pounds.
OV-102 has been modified based on the 5.4 loads to bring it in
line with the rest of the fleet. OV-099 was modified for 5.4
loads prior to delivery while OV-103 and OV-104 were built to the
5.4 loads. Wing leading edge moment ties have now been added to
all four orbiters. Mid-fuselage strap (torsional restraints)
additions have been completed on OV-099 and OV-102 and will be
completed by flight 10 of OV-103 and flight 7 of OV-104.
With the completion of the modifications stated above, the
primary remaining differences between the Orbiter vehicles from a
performance/structural viewpoint will be as follows:
/ 0 b
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a) OV-102 Weight is 5,000 pounds greater than the other
vehicles, a major contributor being additional flight
instrumentation
b) OV-103 and 104 have WTR capability due to upgraded
upper surface TPS
c) OV-099 and 104 have Centaur carrying capability
For the near term, structural limitations and load indicator
redlines are being provided on a flight-by-flight basis. Long
range plans call for the development of a common set of
capabilities for all vehicles while taking into account the
retraining differences noted above. This will provide the maxim urn
possible launch flexibility in terms of Orbiter vehicle
interchangeability, an increasingly important factor as the
flight rate increases.
The Panel has expressed concern in the past over Orbiter brakes
and the thermal protection subsystem. I have received several
briefings on that hardware, in February and May on the brakes and
in March on the waterproofing of the tiles. The JSC Director has
written Headquarters on July 24, 1985, that they are pursuing a
comprehensive and aggressive program to address the
landing/deceleration system problems of the Orbiter which consist
of a dynamic stability problem and a heat/energy capacity
problem. Some key elements of this program are provided below:
1. Provide the changes necessary for routine landings at
KSC. The nose wheel steering is being modified to be
fail safe, the modifications being accomplished on
STS-61A. That will reduce braking requirements by
elimination of the need for differential braking for
steer ing.
2. Testing and analysis are being performed to provide
increased system damping and balancing of brake puck
pr essures.
3. A stiffer main landing gear axle is being
incorporated. Designs for an automatic braking
system and thicker out-board brake stators are
underway.
4. We plan to duplicate the brake problems and assess
fixes via an analytical and test activity (at
Goodrich) and to improve flignt data collection
through additional brake instrumentation. Langley is
conducting tests to determine the impact of runway
surface on brake performance.
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5. We have initiated a preliminary design activity for a
structural carbon brake system. A PDR is scheduled
for September 1985.
6. With the upgrading of the Wright Patterson AFB test
facility, the Orbiter strut, wheel, and braking
system will be tested with a considerably increased
test fidelity.
15
APPENDIX 5. SPACE EXTRA-VEH1CULAR ACTIVITIES (EVA'S) AND
LIFE SCIENCES
ASAP ReconcT>endation
NASA should encourage the development of an advanced higher
pressure EVA suit to replace the exis t ing unit .
NASA Response; The current Shuttle Space suit has performed
excellently since STS-5. All design reach and f lex ib i l i ty
requi rements have been met and exceed that required for an
EVA.
The low pressure suit (4 .3 PSIA) maximizes f lexibi l i ty and
glove dex te r i ty but requi res prebrea th ing to e l iminate the
bends. A higher pressure suit would reduce prebreathe
concerns but would sacr i f ice glove dexter i ty and increase
s u i t leakage. Of course, the other approach to e l iminat ion
of prebrea the is reduced cabin pressure. Reduced cabin
pressure is the Shut t le ' s chosen option for bends control.
The c u r r e n t Agency posture for f u r t h e r space sui t
developments wil l be addressed in the Space Station B
r e q u i r e m e n t s de f in i t i on . These requirements will be
e v a l u a t e d , and a de te rmina t ion will be made as to the
acceptabi l i ty of the c u r r e n t Shut t le system, of an enhanced
system or the need for a new high pressure system. This
decision will be made d u r i n g the FY 1986 or FY 1987 time
period.
Key to the decis ion wil l be the amount of EVA requi red and
the selected Space Station cabin pressure . The Agency ' s
s ta ted goal is to have one EMU/EVA system, which wil l s a t i s f y
all r e q u i r e m e n t s and be cost e f fec t ive .
The a d d i t i o n of telemeteredrdata d u r i n g EVA will reduce
r e q u i r e m e n t s for crew call down of data and will expand the
metabol ic da ta base for EVA planning. This e f f o r t is
c u r r e n t l y u n d e r w a y and wil l use the EKG channel on a shared
basis w i t h l i f e support system data.
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APPENDIX 6. USE OF ORBITER — 102 IN RiD ROLE
ASAP Recommendation
Orbiter OV-1D2 is the most suitably instrumented of the Shuttle
fleet and should be utilized as a research and development
vehicle in addi t ion to its normal mission activities.
NASA Response; NASA agrees with the ASAP recommendation and
is actively engaged in a two part data gather ing program
which will u t i l i z e OV-102 as well as the other vehicles in a
research and development e f f o r t .
One part of the program provides the necessary
ins t rumen ta t ion and data to expand the operational Orbiter
envelope to its fu l l es t . Data to be gathered as a result of
t h i s part of the program includes wing loads, mid-fuselage
thermal g rad ien t s , compartment vent pressures, WTR launch
condi t ions , b rake accelerations and s t rains , f lu t ter , CG
expansion, payload bay environment , and TPS life.
The second par t of the program will provide basic data useful
to follow-on space vehicles. This part of the program is
r e f e r r e d to as the OEX (Orbi te r Exper iments ) . The magni tude
of the e f f o r t can be seen f rom the enclosed OEX Flight
Schedule . The OEX includes the Aerodynamic Coeff ic ient
I n s t r u m e n t a t i o n Package ( A C I P ) , the Shuttle Entry Air Data
System ( S E A D S ) , the Shu t t l e I n f r a r e d Leeside Temperature
Sensor (SILTS) and the Shu t t l e Upper atmosphere Mass
Spectrometer ( S U M S ) .
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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APPENDIX 7, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (KSC) AND VANDENBERG AIR FORCE
BASE (VAFB) COMMON OPERATIONS
ASAP Recommendation
Until such tine as the RSC and VAFB sites have their own launch
crews and dedicated Or biters, the manifesting or scheduling
activity should have a procedure to consider the schedule effects
on crews who must travel back and forth. Also, attention must be
given to the availability of specific Orbiters that may be
required by specific missions. This is particularly critical in
those cases where the DOD may be required to ask for an
unscheduled launch.
NASA Response; The Agency's present approach is to provide
maximum utilization of SPC personnel at both launch sites,
and mission planning at both facilities to account for the
schedule effects on crews who serve those sites. In the case
of early flights from VAFB, launch team personnel from both
RSC and the SPC will assist. In addition, consideration is
being given to the maximum use of SPC personnel at VAFB for
various tasks, such as Orbiter mods, during non-launch
periods. In our manifest planning, orbiter use is also being
optimized between launch sites with consideration being made
for unique DOD requirements. Unscheduled launches will
require a review as the need arises.
Discussion of Fact Finding Points
The ASAP observes that "for some substantial startup time —
years not months — the rate of Shuttle launches from VAFB will
be too low to justify the establishment of a complete launch crew
that would be inactive for most of the year. The present plan is
to use selected military personnel who have had training at KSC
as permanent VAFB personnel and at each launch move the rest of
the required crew from the NASA ranks'at-KSC. None of these
people have had the opportunity to train at VAFB and hence the
crews must be in residence some appreciable time before each
launch, most particularly before the first launch at VAFB."
"While this would seem to be a straight-forward scheduling job,
it is complicated by two facts. First, the DOD may be required
by circumstances to ask for an unscheduled launch on short
notice. Second, the Orbiters are not identical from a structural
load capability and certain loads may require certain Orbiters.
The scheduling problem is not bad if one formally identified it
and is aware of the limitations it may impose on the joi-nt
operations. A subsidiary but important point is that the launch
crews have not trained at VAFB nor has the facility been
exercised. The Panel has recommended that an FRF be conducted at
VAFB prior to the first launch as a facility and crew
"certification. A bonus to such a test would be a partial insight
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into the ' twang 1 ef fect on the stack under the VAFB hold-down
conditions."
The t r a in ing of NASA/KSC and USAF personnel at VAFB will be
achieved through the conduct of an FRF dur ing the processing flow
for the f i r s t launch at VAFB. The decision to conduct this FRF
has been made and scheduling of the FRF and f i r s t launch is in
process for the f i r s t quar ter of 1986.
"Common ground support equipment in t e r fac ing with the space
Shut t le vehicle requi res special attention so that consistent
funct ional design and such in ter face characteristics are r ig id ly
m a i n t a i n e d since loss of conf igura t ion commonality may occur due
to KSC or VAFB programmat ic requirements ."
We believe that the proper e f fo r t s are being exerted to m a i n t a i n
GSE c o n f i g u r a t i o n control and commonality. The VAFB and KSC
common and mod-common GSE is the responsibility of KSC for
des ign , procurement and delivery to VAFB. Mod-common GSE is the
KSC GSE which can be adapted for use at VAFB by design
m o d i f i c a t i o n s . The common and mod-common GSE at VAFB constitute
near ly all of the GSE at VAFB as well as most of the installed
equipment which i n t e r f aces wi th the f l i g h t ha rdware at VAFB. KSC
is also responsible for p repar ing and m a i n t a i n i n g the OMD
(Opera t iona l and Ma in t enance Document) and con f igu ra t i on control
of this GSE.
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APPENDIX 8. SHUTTLE CENTAUR
ASAP Recommendation
While acknowledging the fact that the issues are being addressed,
the Panel urges that the matters of the safety waiver request and
the interpretation of specifications be resolved vith care.ful
deliberation. The ability to make and incorporate significant
design changes for Centaur G' within the time remaining to the
planetary opportunity for Galileo is fast diminishing. With the
major portion of the Centaur G1 qualification test program
remaining to be conducted, it would be highly desirable that the
Centaur project staff be able to concentrate on insuring that the
test requirements are met.
NASA Response: Review and acceptance of waivers to the
Headquarters NHB 1700.7A, "Safety Policy and Requirements for
Paylcads Using the Space Transportation System (STS), are the
responsibilities of the JSC Payload Safety Review Panel. It
is the responsibility of the Centaur Program Office to
determine that those specifications have been met or require
a waiver.
There has been concern over the redundancy and design
margin of the Centaur Super*Zip separation system, and
whether or not the design meets the NHB 1700.7A payload
safety requirements. These concerns, of course, apply also
to the IUS separation system which uses almost an identical
design. Although both systems have completed qualification
testing, new data, as a result of some pyrotechnic research
work at Langley and margin determination testing at JPL for
Galileo, indicate that the design margin may not be as great
as originally thought. Additional testing is being performed
at Langley to resolve this issue.
With regard to changes, only those which are essential to
make the Centaur G' perform its missions are being
incorporated. The schedule is extremely tight. A hydrogen
tank leak has been experienced and was attributed to a design
oversight. A repair has been implemented on the test tank
which has been successfully cycle and proof tested. Tank
integrity was maintained throughout the 1.4 static loads test
and reverification pressure cycle testing. The same fix has
been completed on the flight G-prime tanks. The G-vehicle
redesign has been baselined and the test vehicle will verify
this redesign.
Performance reserves, which were low, have now been reduced
additionally by the required tank beef-up for the repair.
The use of a portion of the Shuttle Program Manager's reserve
is being pursued.
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A special Phase II delta safety review was conducted at
General Dynamics. Dr. Walter Williams recommended a review
by JSC senior management following a special investigation of
the Centaur Shuttle integration activity reported in a letter
dated Feb. 6, 1985. The special safety review was chaired by
Mr. Kohrs of JSC and included senior personnel on the
board. No design changes resulted from the review which
gives us confidence in the work being accomplished to date.
In terms of documenting the program's hazards based on the
safety analysis and the rationale for risk acceptance, the
contractor has not performed as well. Publication of the
safety reports and the failure modes and effects analyses
have been late. The Phase III safety review has been delayed
several months because of inadequate preparations for the
review. This is being given attention at GDC, and additional
manpower is being allocated.
We are equally concerned with regard to the large amount of
qualification testing that has to be done and are sensitive
to ensuring that the program needs are satisfied by
concentrating the appropriate personnel on testing
activities. We fell behind the formal qualification largely
due to late delivery of electronic piece parts, as the
industry in general is experiencing, and due to late planning
of hardware deliveries. To preserve schedule, preliminary
system testing is being accomplished using prototype
hardware. Production hardware will be installed following
acceptance testing. Some will be installed at KSC. However,
all production avionics should be installed before or during
vehicle processing at Launch Complex 36. Qualification
hardware is being built after the flight units to avoid
disrupting vehicle flow.
Relative to abort mode operational constraints, we are
working closely with JSC/RI to identify the various abort
modes, the time available to dump propellents, residuals,
vent rates, etc. The design driver to date appears to be the
late systems TAL (Trans Atlantic Short). To satisfy the
safety constraints, in addition to the Orbiter landing weight
c/g (center of gravity) management, we are implementing a
vacuum inerting capability, which will reduce residuals to
low levels. Testing and analysis are planned to verify this
capability. We are also looking at inhibiting GHj venting
during the critical time of reentry (Orbiter vent door
opening to Mach 1) to preclude ingestion of GH2 into the
Orbiter OMS pod, lower mid fuselage, rudder speed brake and
body flap).
OF
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APPENDIX 9. RADIOISOTOPE THERMOELECTRIC GENERATORS (RTG'S)
FOR GALILEO AND ULYSSES MISSIONS
ASAP Recommendation
"The Panel endorses the proposal made by the ad hoc committee
that addressed the issue to improve coordination among the
organizations involved by appointing a 'single point of contact*
on this subject for each organization. Further , the Panel
endorses the recommendation to assign prime responsibility for
obta in ing f l i gh t clearance to the science mission center* Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)."
NASA Response; I believe that the appropriate contacts have
been designated. Mr. R. Kohrs at JSC is responsible for
coordinat ing the overall Shuttle reliability estimates and
in te r fac ing with the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review
Panel. Mr. J. Cork of JPL has the responsibility for
coordinating act ivi t ies that will result in obtaining f l ight
clearance. That is a fu l l time assignment for Mr. Cork.
Mr. Kohrs has been actively involved in revis ing the "Space
Shutt le Data for Nuc lear Safe ty Analysis" document, JSC
16087, to include the latest program data. STS f a i l u r e modes
and e f f ec t s have been given f u r t h e r analysis, and the f a i l u r e
probabi l i ty est imates are being reevaluated based upon our
exper ience basis.
It should be recalled that JPL coordinates with the DOE, who
owns the FTG's , and who has the task to prepare the "Safety
Analys is Report" ( S A R ) , which describes the f l ight r isk. The
In t e r agency N u c l e a r Safe ty Review Panel ( INSRP) prepares the
"Safety E v a l u a t i o n Report" (SER) af ter reviewing the SAR and
then presents t he i r independent evaluation of the risks. The
NASA INSRP coordinator dis t r ibutes the SER for a review by
the NASA s t a f f , collects the inputs, and prepares a report on
the f l i g h t recommendation for the-NASA Adminis t ra tor which is
fo rwarded to the Whi t e House s ta f f for f l ight approval.
More recent tes t ing for the RTG fuel capsules causes us to be
more op t imis t i c about the capabili ty of the RTG to survive
severe overpressures that are being considered. The shock
tube tes t ing at Los Alamos has shown that it can wi ths tand
1800 psi. There have been a number of meetings held in which
INSRP and NASA par t ic ipants have jointly met to review data
and share p lanning . We are in the process of reviewing
contingency p lanning .
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APPENDIX 10. NASA AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
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ASAP Recommendation
The Aircraft Management Office, as the Agency focal point for all
aircraft operations and related natters, should include, if
practical, an aviation safety function. The NASA centers would
benefit by a single reporting location at Headquarters.
NASA Response; As the Panel pointed out, progress is being
made in centralizing management of aircraft operations.
Further, the Panel's specific recommendation that NASA
Headquarters include aviation safety management and aircraft
operations management in a single office has been
accomplished. The Aircraft Management Office has been
assigned the additional function of operational aviation
safety and, in addition, this particular function has been
strengthened by the hiring of two exceptionally qualified
individuals in the areas of aviation safety and human factors
engineering (human performance). Also as the Panel had
recommended, the Centers now have a single reporting location
in Headquarters. The Office of the Chief Engineer will
continue aviation safety oversight to provide the appropriate
audit function. The objective of these adjustments is to
clearly separate implementation from oversight. Mr. Parmet
met at Patrick Air Force Base in February with the
Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel and sat in on
deliberations concerning the implementation of agencywide
aircraft operations guidelines. The target date for
publishing this document is September 1985.
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